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IN LUCE TUA
C omment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
Reflections on the Papal Visit
The pope's visit to America last month is very old
news by now, and it has been analyzed to the point of
intellectual stupefaction. But it still bears thinking
about for what it reveals about our present cultural
condition.
One of the things it reveals--or rather reminds us
of-is the unfathomable reaches of fatuity and trivialization the American media are capable of when they
engage theological matters. Much of the coverage of
the pope himself came down to the conclusion that he
is a very nice-perhaps even charismatic-man who
unfortunately holds some very peculiar views about religious faith and life. Why, one was led to wonder,
would such a genial and charming soul (and who is so
good with children) cling to such retrograde theological and social opinions? As for the divisions within
American Catholicism, they were most of the time reduced to the all-purpose formula for such matters, enlightenment vs. obscurantism: the church, which before Vatican II was dogmatic and authoritarian, has
since struggled to become open and tolerant Uust like
the Protestants) but is being held back by reactionaries
in the Vatican.
Television, as usual, easily outdid the other media in
superficiality. Most TV reporters covered the visit
much like a political campaign trip, assessing the
pope's significance in terms of crowd estimates and
poll ratings and speaking of him as if he were the
ecclesiastical equivalent of Ronald Reagan: would his
personal popularity be enough to overcome popular
disagreement with him on the "issues"? Coverage of
those issues also followed the standard inanities of the
political model: achieve "balance" by alternating between extremists (one radical nun for every Tridentine
traditionalist) and then bring in a mildly liberal follower of the via media (Cardinal Bernardin, perhaps)
for a moderate wrap-up. It wasn't all that bad, of
course, but it was bad enough often enough to make
one despair of the ability of American popular TV
ever to do justice to serious religious subjects.
But we don't need a papal visit to instruct us in the
inadequacy of the media to provide intellectual substance. The more serious cultural revelation offered by
the pope's visit gets to the matter of fundamental national values and to certain contradictions in the modern American psyche.
Everywhere one turns today, one runs into alarmed
discussion of a supposed crisis in moral values ocOctober, 1987

casioned by a modern decline into relativism. We have
lost, it is said, our moral anchors; in place of the clear
enjoinders and prohibitions of the past we have manuevered ourselves into endless moral equivocations
where everything is perennially up for grabs and nothing can be decreed for certain. In such an atmosphere,
we inevitably drift into a kind of do-it-yourself morality that, for all its convenience for 'short-term gratification, leaves us emotionally unsatisfied and morally at
sea.

Much of the coverage of the pope
himself came down to the conclusion
that he is a very nice-perhaps even
charismatic-man who unfortunately
holds some peculiar religious views.

The theme of morality lost is of course a staple of
the conservative imagination, which tends to an often
romanticized vision of the moral plateau whose heights
we have forsaken and a frequently exaggerated sense
of the depths into which we have declined. T he conservative's paradise lost is often a paradise that never
was. Yet the recent reaction against relativism and the
concomitant search for stable and perduring values
has not been restricted to conservatives; it has become
a common theme of our culture. Everyone-left, right,
and center-is into values, and people everywhere indicate rhetorical longings for a value system embedded
in something more substantial than personal predilections and errant enthusiasms. The popularity of works
of cultural criticism like Allan Bloom's The Closing of
the American Mind (see Mark Schwehn's critique elsewhere in these pages) can be traced in no small part
to their withering criticism of moral relativism and
their austere insistence on high and permanent ethical
standards.
Yet when someone like the pope comes along, offering us a precise set of values and a belief system in
which those values might enduringly be set, we back
off; indeed, we resist. And not just those who do not
share the theological or ecclesiastical commitments out
of which the pope speaks. Christians in general and
Catholics in particular, confronted by the pope's severe demands, react with the affronted vocabulary of
American liberal individualism. Who is the popewhat is the church-to tell us what we should believe
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or how we should act? All of a sudden we are insistent
pluralists again, demanding our rights to set our own
moral paths by our own moral lights, resentful of any
person or any tradition that would presume to establish authoritative and binding moral guidelines.
It all seems very perverse, and in part it is. The
pope's moral seriousness exposes our moral evasions.
We tell ourselves that we want solid moral values, but
in fact we do not--or at least we do not want the
moral disciplines those values imply. We want desperately to feel good, or at least better, about ourselves
and we sense that that will require an escape from
moral solipsism, yet we refuse to be held liable to the
objective requirements of the Christian (or any other)
tradition and justify that refusal in the name of moral
freedom. The young Augustine asked to be made virtuous but not just yet; we ask to be made virtuous but
only on our own terms.
But things are not quite that simple and the problem is more than one of human perversity. Not all
those within the Catholic church who resist the pope's
moral strictures have given in to moral anarchy or the
siren-songs of American ethical individualism. There
are dissidents and dissidents; some are simply chronic
rebels, but others have thoughtful reasons to give for
the reservations they raise concerning papal decrees.
If it is the temptation of the laity to demand a moral
freedom that orthodoxy cannot rightly allow, it is the
temptation of the hierarchy to demand a standard of
obedience that orthodoxy does not necessarily require.
At the heart of Catholic moral teaching lies the concept of the natural law, which presupposes an objective order of right and truth that exists independently
of our perception of it, but which is accessible both by
inclination and by reason. Radical philosophical modernity would deny the concept itself, and so must be
rejected by Catholic--or other Christian--orthodoxy.
But a more modest modernity may be heeded, that
which brings into question not the existence of truth
but the possibilities of our comprehensive apprehension of it. Modernity need not reduce us to skepticism,
but it should induce in us a certain humility.
It is hardly the place of non-Catholics to presume to
instruct Rome on the workings of its magisterium, but
many faithful sons and daughters of the church have
themselves raised questions as to the moral prudence
of the hierarchy insisting as forcefully as it recently
has on obedience in hard cases. The pope has rightly
noted that it has never been easy for Christians to follow the full "truths of the gospel," but surely the history of the church is replete with examples of overspecifications, later quietly discarded, of what those
truths consist of.
One cannot reasonably expect (nor would one want)
4

the church to reverse itself, or even retreat to a discreet silence, on such fundamental moral questions as
abortion or homosexual behavior; reversals there
would have the effect of dismantling the natural law
tradition itself. Yet one wonders if such a matter as artificial birth control must necessarily fall into the same
category. On that question the disavowal and disregarding of the church's official teaching has by no
means been restricted to extremists, habitual dissenters, or moral latitudinarians. What appears to have
occurred , rather, is a genuine and profound shift in
the sensus fidelium (the sense of the faithful) on the
ISSUe .

If it is the temptation of the laity
to demand a moral freedom that
orthodoxy cannot rightly allow, it is
the temptation of the hierarchy to
demand a standard of obedience that
orthodoxy does not strictly require.
It is awkward and presumptious for non-Catholic
Christians to address themselves to these matters, and
we venture to do so here only because of the great regard we have for the essential message and mission of
the pope and of the church of which he is chief
bishop. Rome is the ally of faithful Christians
everywhere, and whatever weakens Catholicism
weakens all who go by the name of Christ. We need
the Catholic church's reminder to heedless liberals that
in following the dictates of conscience we must first of
all ensure that our consciences have been rightly instructed. We need as well the disciplines of the natural
law tradition with its compelling repudiation of moral
relativism.
But those who would proclaim authoritatively have
the responsibility of exercising their moral authority
with prudence and restraint, and of not presuming to
know more than can plausibly be claimed about the
application of general principles to particular situations. Those who have the care of souls are right to
insist that we can't simply make up our own moral
rules as we go along, but they need to make certain
that they not impose upon us a superfluity of moral
burdens. American culture's permanent susceptibility
to antinomianism won't be cured by an alien authoritarianism. The pope is right to want to call Americans to a more serious moral life, and he strikes a responsive chord in many of us when he does so, but we
will only respond fully to those calls of authority to
which we can give credible assent.
Cl
The Cresset

Mark Schwehn

BLOOM IN LOVE
A Critical Reading of The Closing of the American Mind

Sometime during the 1940s Allan Bloom fell in love
with the University of Chicago. Or, in his own words
from his book The Closing of the American Mind, he fell
in love "with the idea of the university" (245). Or
again perhaps he fell in love at that time with learning
or wisdom, for, as he reminds us, the university "is
after all only a vehicle for contents in principle separable from it" (245).
Did Bloom then fall in love with a particular place,
a place to which he has now happily returned as a
professor in the Committee on Social Thought? And
did this love lead him in Platonic fashion first to a love
of the idea of the university and then to a love of wisdom? Or are these various objects-an institution, an
idea, and a way of life-somehow confused in Bloom's
mind? And what of the quality and the depth of the
love Bloom feels for any or all of these things?
Why, we might wonder, should the course and character of a particular professor's passions concern us at
all? The Closing of the American Mind has been for some
time now a best-selling book that addresses weighty
matters of public concern. Its surprising popularity attests, I think, to the hunger for informed thought
about what is widely perceived to be an educational
crisis in this country.
The period of official reports and commissioned
studies has passed. And we now have before us a
number of books that seem to hold out the promise of
more thoroughgoing and well-reasoned diagnoses of
our present ills as well as some well-considered measures for remedying them. What E. D. Hirsch has
sought to do for the state of elementary and secondary
education in his Cultural Literacy (another best seller),
Bloom proposes to do for the state of higher learning
in the United States. Bloom's book, however, precisely
because of the flawed character of the passion that
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governs it, should deeply disappoint all friends of liberal education.
As Bloom himself tells us, "a virtue governs a passion, as moderation governs lust, or courage governs
fear" (129), so it seems strange to say that passion governs Bloom's own book. Strange but true. This is disappointing rather than merely irritating, because
Bloom could have taught us a great deal about liberal
learning and its fate in the United States: much of his
book gives evidence of that potential. But Bloom's wisdom about such matters is overwhelmed by such an
array of passions-rage, indignation, contempt,
hatred, resentment-that the reader must maintain a
level of inhuman self-control in order to profit from
it.
And these passions are invariably those of the disappointed lover, of one trapped in the state of "love's
mad self-forgetting" (I22) who has grown, given the
flawed character of that love, to despise much of what
he once loved in order to soothe his f~elings of rejection. The university failed Bloom, not Bloom the university. So we get an account (this is Bloom's subtitle)
of "how higher education has failed democracy and
impoverished the souls of today's students."
II

Bloom does not deliver the account that he promises. In his judgment, the souls of today's students are
so shrunken and deformed that it is inconceivable that
anyone or anything, least of all the university by any
description, could further impoverish them. The first
third of The Closing of the American Mind, entitled "Students," characterizes today's young people as virtually
uneducable. Because they have not been nourished on
great books, they come to college without "that refinement of the mind's eye that permits it to see the delicate distinctions among men, among their deeds and
their motives" (61).
There are other art forms, of course, but these
Bloom dismisses with a series of contemptuous and
5

sweeping pronouncements. "Films . . . with serious
pretentions have become intolerably ignorant and
manipulative" (64). So much for the wonder of E. T.
and the nobility of Chariots of Fire, not to speak of
many other and better films for children and young
adults. Music, but only rock music, is "the youth culture," all rock music reduces to Mick Jaggerism, and
Mick Jaggerism creates the typical thirteen-year-old
"whose body throbs with orgasmic rhythms; whose
feelings are made articulate in hymns to the joys of
onanism or the killing of parents; whose ambition is to
win fame and wealth in imitating the drag-queen who
makes the music. In short, life is made into a nonstop,
commercially prepackaged masturbational fantasy"
(75).

Bloom's passions imperil the reader's
capacity to reason with him. He is
too often the negative image of what
he holds up before us as the ideal of
the liberally-educated human being.
What are friends of liberal education to do with
such cranky characterizations of "today's students"?
We might try to extract from Bloom's text what is well
considered and well tempered. So, for example, we
might wonder with him about "whether the experience
of the greatest texts from early childhood is not a prerequisite for a concern throughout life for them and
for lesser but important literature" (62). The answer to
this question is in my own mind by no means certain,
but the question is worth considering anew, with instruction from some of Bloom's discussion and from
other sources that impinge in various ways upon it. I
am thinking here of such books as Hirsch's Cultural
Literacy and Frye's The Educated Imagination.
Bloom, however, seems determined to make even
this enterprise difficult, for just as the reader is about
to engage Bloom's thinking, he launches into an impassioned diatribe. Thus, for example, he settles the
reader into his argument about the importance of an
early digestion of substantial intellectual fare, and he
then suddenly announces, with a categorical self-assurance that is typical, "The latest enemy of the vitality of
classic texts is feminism" (65). This is simply false.
Some feminists may drain the classic texts of their vitality, as may some Marxists, some Platonists, and a few
Rotarians. But the intellectual enterprises that have
arisen from feminism per se have commonly displayed
one of two constructive attitudes toward the classics.
There has been much carefully-reasoned argument
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for enlarging the canon of the Great Books (seldom
for subtracting from it), a project that Bloom himself,
perhaps in an unguarded moment, finds unobjectionable (344). But there has more often been a range of
efforts, featuring a normal rate of success and failure,
to revitalize the classic texts by approaching them with
a new set of questions and interp etative skills. Thus,
when Phyllis Trible asks her~elf what really is the
teaching of Genesis 2:4b-3:24 about human sexuality,
her inquiry prompts her to write a very incisive interpretation of that classic creation story as a chapter
of her God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality. Again, Bloom's
passions imperil the reader's capacity to reason with
him. He is altogether too frequently the negative
image of what he holds up before us as the ideal of
the liberally-educated human being.
Friends of liberal learning might pursue another
and more fruitful line of inquiry in view of Bloom's
characterization (really caricature) of "today's students." Suppose that Bloom is right: suppose today's
students really are unable to recognize, much less appreciate, excellence, deafened by orgiastic music, and
incapable of love. Why try to teach them?
Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, was firm and
clear about this matter. The teaching of political science, which was, for him, the architectonic science that
investigated all of the questions that Bloom quite
properly believes to be at the center of a liberal education, was, Aristotle believed, utterly wasted on the
young. For, "since the young man tends to follow his
passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable .. . .
And it makes no difference whether he is young in
years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each
successive object, as passion directs."
The danger in Bloom's fulminations against today's
students stems from the passion behind them, a passion that in turn panders to a mood that overtakes all
of us in higher education from time to time. The virtue of Aristotle's restrained and direct statement of the
issue is that it forces the friends of liberal education
to examine themselves, to see how seriously they really
take their own occasionally-despairing judgments
about the young, and to consider the implications of
those judgments for the ways in which they have chosen to live and learn and teach. Which one of us has
not voiced sentiments very similar to Bloom's about
several of our students' lack of wonder about the
world, their apparent indifference in the presence of
high and excellent things, their sordid and confused
longings, and their strange tastes for noise as opposed
to music?
Bloom takes these commonplace observations and
ordinary frustrations, dresses them up in portentous
The Cresset

phrases, and offers them to us as definitive cultural
pronouncements. Aristotle, with great verbal economy
and with no interest in merely inflaming our irritations, forces us to wonder about what should be taught
to whom at what time. Aristotle provokes questioning;
Bloom, in his discussion of today's students, merely
provokes.

III
He apparently pro.vokes himself even more than he
provokes his readers, for he is so busy heaping scorn
upon students that he eventually argues against his
own thesis, namely that the university has impoverished their souls. The third section of his book,
in which Bloom analyzes and traces historically what
he takes to be the intellectual corruption of the modern university, reaches its climax in a brief chapter
that is simply entitled "The Sixties." The reader,
mindful of Bloom's thesis and perhaps persuaded by
at least a significant portion of Bloom's philosophical
critique of the university, fully expects to find in this
culminating chapter an explanation of the student disorders of the 1960s in terms of the impoverishing effect that the university had upon them. Nothing of the
kind emerges. Instead, we learn that the students
ruined the university.
This incoherent conclusion is as revealing as it is
surprising. It reveals the source of Bloom's deep and
lasting antipathy to students, for they, in his judgment,
"declared [the university] bankrupt and thereby bankrupted it. They abandoned the grand liberal traditions
of learning" (334). They, in other words, destroyed
the object of Bloom's love, and he obviously cannot
ever forgive them for it.
Had Bloom confined himself to a discussion of the
episode that he treats at the beginning of this chapter,
he might have earned a certain measure of sympathy
both for his views and for his sentiments. He tells us
about a series of incidents that took place at Cornell
University during April of 1969. These events culminated in the spectacle of "ten thousand triumphant
students supporting a group of black students who
had just persuaded 'us,' the faculty of Cornell University, to do their will by threatening the use of firearms
as well as threatening the lives of individual professors" (313).
This spectacle and other related events, such as the
threat made by a black faculty member upon the life
of a black student when the student refused to participate in a demonstration, do warrant a certain measure
of outrage and moral indignation. And for a time,
Bloom directs his own indignation at what are, given
his thesis, its proper objects, at the university, its faculOctober, 1987

ty, and its administration, for having displayed in this
instance "a mixture of cowardice and moralism not
uncommon at the time" (316).
Whatever degree of sympathy one might have for
Bloom or for his views should quickly dissipate, however, as he turns from his account of what happened
at a particular place at a particular time to the most
careless and irresponsible treatment of "the Sixties"
and the "student movement" that I have ever read.
And Bloom gives us, ironically enough, the explanation for why his account is so poorly reasoned and so
thoughtlessly composed. "Indignation," he asserts in
the middle of "The Sixties" chapter, "may be a most
noble passion and necessary for fighting wars and
righting wrongs. But of all the experiences of the soul
it is the most inimical to reason and hence to the university" (327). In other words, indignation may have
been necessary for Bloom's efforts to right the wrongs
he witnessed at Cornell in April of 1969, but it is inimical to his efforts now to give a reasonable account of
the 1960s.
The defects of Bloom's account of the Sixties are
worth examining in some detail, for they both display
and explain some of the defects that pervade his book.
He assures us that "about the Sixties it is now fashionable to say that although there were indeed excesses,
many good things resulted" (320). This claim is false.
The Sixties have come to occupy a place in the minds
of a cohort of educated Americans that is similar in
some respects to the place once occupied by the
Dreyfus affair in France. Those who endured the Sixties have come to feel that it marked something of a
cultural and a political divide in American history, and
they have enlisted themselves on one side or the other
of a whole range of questions about the character of
the American democratic experiment by taking up
fixed positions on the meaning and the value of that
ill-defined period.
There simply is no currently fashionable consensus
about the matter of the Sixties. If anything, contemporary thought about the Sixties has tended toward more
negative appraisals. Thus, as so often happens in his
book, Bloom is actually on the side of majority opinion
even as he fancies himself to be a voice crying in the
wilderness. Indeed, Bloom may have by now discovered this much for himself, and the great popularity
of his book should seem less inexplicable to him now
than it did at first.
One of the best historical treatments of the Sixties,
Allen Matusow's The Unraveling of America, might also
seem to be in basic accord with Bloom's attitudes, for
Matusow, like Bloom, severely criticizes both the student movement and assorted radical groups such as
the Black Panthers. But here the similarity between
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Matusow and Bloom ends, because Matusow interprets
the Sixties in terms of the failure of American
liberalism, a failure that he understands in terms of
social, political, moral, and intellectual defects within
liberalism. And for Matusow, the Vietnam war, more
than anything else, both exposed and accelerated the
demise of liberal democracy. Indeed, if Matusow is
correct, a portion of Bloom's thesis should be inverted:
during the 1960s, liberal democracy failed the universities, not vice-versa.

If one refuses to consider the war in
Vietnam as part of an effort to
understand student speech and
behavior during the 1960s, one is
bound to develop bizarre and untenable
explanations. And so Bloom does.
Bloom should have at least considered some version
of Matusow's thesis about the failure of liberalism. I
doubt that Bloom has read Matusow, since Bloom's
book gives no evidence of his having done so. But
Bloom has read and he often invokes Tocqueville, who
said some very instructive things about democracies at
war. Democratic regimes, Tocqueville observed, are
the slowest to engage in warfare, but, once engaged,
they are the least apt to cease fighting short of total
victory or defeat.
Thus, Bloom should have pondered the effects of a
war-whose purposes were obscure and ever shifting,
whose leadership was inept, whose pretexts were deceptive, and whose terms of victory and defeat were so
uncertain as to render the conflict potentially interminable-upon liberal democracy and more especially
upon the generation of young people who were conscripted into its service. Yet no trace of such consideration appears in Bloom's chapter on the Sixties. Indeed, Bloom has done something I would have
thought impossible for a responsible thinker: he has
analyzed the Sixties without even once mentioning the war in
Vietnam. (This is not, strictly speaking, true, for on p.
329 Bloom does mention "the war" in a subordinate
clause at the end of a paragraph .)
The beginnings of the student movement antedated
the war, of course, being linked initially to aspects of
the Civil Rights movement of the Fifties and early Sixties. But the student movement would never have become a large-scale movement had it not been for the
war, which proved properly to be the central concern
of the students as the Sixties progressed. Thus, if one
refuses to consider the war as part of an effort to un-
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derstand student speech and behavior during the
1960s, one is bound to develop bizarre and untenable
explanations. And so Bloom does.
At times, in his desperate effort to explain student
and faculty behavior without the war, Bloom resorts to
rhetorical strategies that he finds contemptible in his
subjects. So, for example, he has this to say about the
loose moral reasoning of the Sixties: "Hitler became
the regulative principle of the conscience: 'You
wouldn't obey Hitler, would you?' So refined had the
capacity for moral discrimination become, it followed
that the elected American officials and the duly approved federal, state, and local laws had no more authority than did Hitler" (326). As though he does not
wish to be outdone by his subjects' specious arguments , Bloom himself compares Woodstock to the
Nuremberg rallies of the Third Reich (314), and he
insists that there was no appreciable difference between American professors collaborating with the student movement of the 1960s and Martin Heidegger's
capitulating to the Nazis (315).
Other defects in Bloom's analysis of the Sixties are
less obvious and therefore more insidious. For example, he insists that "a histrionic version of moral conduct, the kind that characterizes heroes in extreme
situations," dominated the Sixties. "Thomas More's resistance to a tyrant's command was the daily fare of
students' imagination. Such challenges-which arise
rarely, are always ambiguous in terms of both duty
and motive, and require the subtlest reasoning as well
as all the other virtues in the highest degree in order
to be addressed justly-were the moral stuff on which
these cubs teethed. It was not, of course, the complexity of such cases that was attractive but their brilliance,
the noble pose." (325). These are half-truths.
Some of us did look to More for instruction and inspiration, as we looked to the Socrates of the Crito,
who argued that it was a good thing to obey even a
bad law, or to St. Augustine and his teachings about
just and unjust wars. But it was precisely the complexity of these examples and arguments that drew some
of us to them. We knew that More had sought out
every possible means honorably to serve his king. We
believed that his example was a warning against grand
and precipitous moral confrontations.
And so most of us practically memorized the Selective Service laws, believing that we should exhaust all
legal remedies before we considered choosing to disobey those laws. Many of us believed that we also
owed something of our own knowledge about these
matters to those of our fellow citizens who were ignorant of the legal options open to them, and so we
served as draft counsellors to the poor and uneducated. Some of us ultimately won conscientious-objecThe Cresset

tor status, others refused induction and went to
prison, others emigrated. None of those who were my
friends at the time sought, much less relished, grand
moral posturing. We were rather inclined to agree
with Dietrich Bonhoeffer who taught us that in many
circumstances "there is no pure place to stand."
My testimony here proves very little, of course. My
friends at Valparaiso University and later at Stanford
may have been atypical. But I doubt that our opinions
and actions were any less typical than those that
Bloom ascribes to a nebulous "they" (does he mean all
students, most students, students at elite colleges and
universities, students at Cornell, or, as in the passage
above, "these cubs"?). I really do not yet fully understand the student movement, though I suspect that we
will always have a skewed view of it if we dwell
primarily upon students at Columbia, Berkeley, Michigan, and Cornell.
In any event, Bloom manages less to interpret a
movement and more to disclose the depth of the
trauma that he suffered in the midst of one particularly outrageous episode of that movement. He really
does mean to ascribe the thoughts and actions he condemns to the entire student movement. And this ascription seems unjustified. My testimony does suggest
that much.

Traumatized and indignant, Bloom
really gives us, in his chapter on
the Sixties, a combination of a
lament disguised as philosophy and
a harangue disguised as history.
Traumatized and indignant, Bloom really gives us,
in his Sixties chapter, a combination of a lament disguised as philosophy and a harangue disguised as history. One is reminded here of Thomas Paine's rejoinder in The Rights of Man to the "historical" portions of
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. "Mr.
Burke should recollect that he is writing history and
not plays; and that his readers will expect truth, and
not the spouting rant of high-toned declamation . . . .
I cannot consider Mr. Burke's book in scarcely any
other light than a dramatic performance; and he must,
I think, have considered it in the same light himself,
by the poetical liberties he has taken of omitting some
facts, distorting others, and making the machinery
bend to produce a stage effect."
Bloom produces his own stage effects, including a
ludicrous scene, one of his "greatest satisfactions as a
teacher," when some of his students, "who really looked
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down from the classroom on the frantic activity outside," went "down from the library seminar room into
the agora," and there distributed what they deemed
appropriate lines from Plato's Republic to the rabble
(332; italics Bloom's). But Bloom's Sixties chapter is
Burke without the latter's rhetorical elegance, without
even an ancien regime to mourn.

IV
The ancien regime of university education in the
United States had already begun seriously to crumble
by the time Bloom arrived, just after World War II,
at the University of Chicago and fell in love with it.
This is the thesis of Parts II and III of The Closing of
the American Mind. Part II, entitled "Nihilism, American Style," examines the process by which "Western
rationalism has culminated in a rejection of reason"
(240). Part III, entitled "The University," provides
what Bloom calls an "idiosyncratic history of the university" that is designed to trace its decline from an
Enlightenment version that was, for all its faults, governed by reason, to a mid-twentieth-century version
that is governed, if at all, by a concern for "values"
and "value commitments" (312). In a final chapter,
"The Student and the University," Bloom surveys the
bleak condition of today's university, and he suggests
a few measures for improving its plight.
These are the strongest sections of Bloom's book.
Part II is really about relativism, its origins, and its
triumph, albeit in various anemic forms, within both
popular and academic culture in the United States. In
Bloom's judgment, this intellectual development represents the victory of German ideas, especially the
thought of Nietzsche and Weber, over the American
mind. He is most troubled by the unthinking way in
which most Americans have adopted relativistic perspectives and vocabularies. "It is not the immorality of
relativism that I find appalling. What is astounding
and degrading is the dogmatism with which we accept
such relativism, and our easygoing lack of concern
about what that means for our lives" (239).
In Part III, Bloom addresses in a sustained and relatively measured fashion a number of thorny issues,
such as the shifting historical relationships between
philosophy and politics, the related matter of the
sometimes healthy tension between the university and
society, and the struggle between Ancients and Moderns "for the possession of rationalism" (264). He also
advances his own ideas about the vocation of the university. He argues that the university must first of all
"maintain the permanent questions front and center ...
by keeping alive the works of those who best addressed these questions" (252). Knowing the questions, the
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university will "protect reason from itself' by preserving a variety of alternative explorations of them (253).
But Bloom is not arguing here for a mere inventory
of opinions and arguments; rather, he insists that the
parts of a university must understand themselves in
terms of an overall "quest for and even discovery of
the truth according to nature" (254).
Bloom is by no means the first thinker to identify
relativism as the central problem of our times, but his
treatment of relativism and its attendant difficulties is
often fresh and sometimes searching. I doubt that relativism is quite so monolithic an academic position as
Bloom supposes, and I believe that its roots are deeper
and more tangled than Bloom's analysis would
suggest. I therefore prefer Alasdair Macintyre to
Bloom as a cultural diagnostician.

Bloom is by no means the first
thinker to identify relativism as
the central problem of our times,
but his treatment of relativism and
its attendant difficulties is often
fresh and sometimes searching.
In his After Virtue, Macintyre demonstrates that our
moral discourse consists of opinions and arguments
drawn from a number of incompatible traditions of
moral thought. Thus, for Macintyre, our problem is
intellectual incoherence, not merely relativism. On the
other hand, Macintyre develops an account of the
good life, based upon his reading of Aristotle, that
tends to be an exquisitely elaborate version of the relativism that Bloom condemns. Bloom, informed especially by Plato but also by his rather different reading
of Aristotle, insists that there is really a correct account
of both nature and the good life that we can in principle know, and that the soundness of this account will
not depend, as it does for Macintyre, in any essential
way upon our own individual life stories, practices, or
community ties.
Whatever the case, both men would agree that the
current problems of the university are finally
philosophical in nature. We therefore need more and
better thought about the university, not an endless
parade of quick and superficial "remedies" that respond to popular trends and demands.
Such thinking might profitably begin with a more
thorough study of Macintyre and, yes, of the second
and third parts of Bloom's book, minus the offensive.
chapter about the Sixties. These parts of Bloom's book
are relatively free of the snide and frivolous remarks
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that permeate the rest of it. Readers will simply have
to ignore Bloom's suggestion that John Rawls' Theory
of justice makes it possible to understand Fear of Flying
as "a significant expression of our situation" (229).
And they will have to try to forgive his caricature of
Hannah Arendt as an American Lotte Lenya, singing
siren songs of "neurotic and decadent longing" like
those that once charmed the Weimar Republic to bewitch the souls of our people (151-2).
These acts of restraint and charity on the part of the
reader will open the possibility of learning from
Bloom's often penetrating discussions of thinkers such
as Rousseau, Locke, and Nietzsche. For in these discussions Bloom' does manage to exemplify his ideal of the
liberally educated human being: someone who thinks
about and with the great thinkers about perennially
vital matters of human concern. In the remainder of
the book, one will find precious little of "that refinement of the mind's eye that permits it to see the delicate distinctions among men, among their deeds and
their motives" that should, according to Bloom,
characterize one who has been nourished by the Great
Books.
The hypothesis suggested by the title of the present
essay represents my own effort to account for this
wildly uneven quality of Bloom's book, which, I do believe, really is the somewhat mad lament of a disappointed lover. Bloom is correct: "The philosophic life
is not the university" (272). But he has forgotten this,
or rather he has often confused his love of wisdom
and truth for his love of a particular place at a particular time. He should and does know, in his better
moments, that wisdom and truth are eternal, whereas
even the University of Chicago will pass away.
There are, moreover, other loves, apparently undreamed of in Bloom's philosophy, that can and have
served well as spurs to inquiry. Our students do long
for "the overcoming of necessity, tension, and conflict,
a resting of the soul from its eternal travail." And this
desire is not, as Bloom would have it, "the most powerful of modern longings" (51; italics mine). "Oh Lord,
Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are
restless until they rest in Thee." This was written by
St. Augustine at the beginning of one of the few great
books about education, and the Augustine of the Confessions was surely not a Modern in any sense of the
word.
Perhaps we can at last respond in part to at least
one of Bloom's questions. "Are we lovers anymore?"
he asks. "This is my way of putting the educational
question of our times" (133). Bloom at least is a lover,
and doubtless there are others. But those of us who
seek enlightenment about liberal education had best
beware of the disappointed ones.
~~
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Fredrick Barton

ROWING TO SWEDEN
A Postmodern Confession of Faith

The subject is God. It arises, today, this way:
It is early morning, and I am lying in bed, drifting
toward wakefulness. My wife curls against me. Softly,
mostly still asleep, she says, "I love you." I put my arm
around her, and she repositions herself with her head
on my chest. I brush my hand across her warm flank
and nestle my face into her hair. And I find myself
praymg.
I pray, "Thank you, God, for this woman, for the
love we share, for the opportunity to know love and
to understand its distinction from desire. Thank you
that after ten years with this woman my love continues
to grow and to seem daily as wondrous to me as all
existence must to a new-born babe. Thank you for the
life we have built together. Thank you for the security
our love affords us ."
This prayer is heartfelt and sincere. But then I am
conscious of praying it, and I am shocked. For I do
not believe in God.
Or if I believe in God, I do so only intermittently.
And even when I believe in God, I do so only hesitantly. Always, I think, as applied to me, the words
"wish for God" are more apt than the words "believe
in God." And yet my wish for God is a constant force
in my life. I wish for God frequently, find myself
thanking God for my blessings regularly. And always
I ask myself, "How can this be?"
What follows is a chimera, one part essay, one part
autobiographical rumination, one part literary criticism, a layman's labored answer to the question, "How
can this be?"

Fredrick Barton is Chairman of Freshman English at the
University of New Orleans where he teaches Creative Writing
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newsmagazine Gambit and the author of two novels, The
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II
The subject is God, His (or Her - I will use the
masculine pronoun out of convention - actually, I
think of God as without gender) existence, most important His presence and activity in the contemporary
world. It arises, today, this way:
I find myself giving thanks to God for my wife and
for the astonishing blessing that is my love for her.
And then I am conscious of my prayer and I am annoyed with myself. For, though my belief in Him is
murky at best, I am annoyed with God.
I am annoyed with God because I have recently
been going through a bad time. The particular circumstances of this period of unhappiness are not really relevant - I have suffered other such periods in
the past and will no doubt suffer more in the future.
But I will pause to say that my current situation involves the impending loss of some employment I have
enjoyed outside of my duties at the university, employment that provides me with a nice bit of extra income
every year through work that I very much look forward to performing. I am losing this employment, in
my view, because the executive abilities of my employer are severely impaired. In ending our relationship, in other words, he is, I judge, making a grievously stupid mistake. But much as I am angrily frustrated with my employer, secretly, subconsciously, I
blame God.
I blame God in whom I only dimly and only occasionally believe. And thus I remind myself of Lieutenant Scheisskopfs wife from Joseph Heller's black comedy about World War II, Catch-22. Lieutenant
Scheisskopfs wife is an avowed atheist who gets into
a violent argument with the protagonist, Yossarian,
with whom she agrees that there is no God.
The God in whom Yossarian disbelieves is responsible for "such phenomena as phlegm and tooth decay."
"What in the world was running through that warped,
evil, scatalogical mind of His, "Yossarian asks Lieuten11

ant Scheisskopfs wife, "when He robbed old people of
the power to control their bowel movements?" And
"Why in the world did he ever create pain?''
Lieutenant Scheisskopfs wife responds to Yossarian's tirade with the illogical admission that "the God
I don't believe in is a good God, a just God, a merciful
God. He's not the mean and stupid God you make
him out to be." And that's how I'm like Lieutenant
Scheisskopfs wife. The God I don't believe in is the
God of Jesus of Nazareth. He is a good God, a just
God, and a merciful God. And I am angry at him for
not recognizing that I am a fundamentally decent
human being who does not deserve to be deprived of
this instance of employment I so cherish.
As I lie awake in the early morning, having caught
myself giving thanks for my wife, I suddenly know
that I blame God for my recent period of pain because
I have not once called upon Him for either solace or
relief. I think, I guess, that if God is doing his job, He
should know of my anguish, that I should hardly have
to remind Him that I don't want to be unfairly deprived of my job. Haven't I thanked God for the blessing of this employment often enough in the past for
Him to be convinced that I love it?
I chide myself, of course, that my loss of this work
can hardly rank as one of God's top priorities. No
matter how much I enjoy it, it's a second job after all,
a mere supplement to my income. I will survive quite
nicely without it. It's not as if I'm going to be impoverished. It's not as if I'm physically maimed. There
are, in other words, an infinite number of worse
things that could happen to me. And an infinite
number of worse things are obviously happening to
other people every day, things God would surely give
his attention before the loss of a college professor's
supplemental employment.
But then I examine my self-chastisement. It is based
on the frustrating acknowledgement that my suffering
is insignificant beside the suffering of others and thus
the implication that I have little standing to call on
God for relief. But isn't such a premise based upon a
nettling assumption about God's presence and activity
in the world? Does God have priorities? If God has
priorities, doesn't that imply some limitation on His
ability to act in the world? Doesn't that imply some
limits to his power? And doesn 't that call into question
God's very godliness?
And so I reflect on what it is I think about God, on
how I think about his godliness. I was raised in a religious family. My father was a Baptist minister, a New
Testament professor at a Baptist seminary for many
years. I was reared to believe in the God of Jesus
Christ. "God is Love," I was told. "God is like Jesus. "
And so I believed in a God who was longsuffering,
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compassionate, and forgiving.
But I was also taught to believe in a God of power
and activity in this world , a God who listened to our
prayers and responded to them if our motives were
pure and our requests unselfish. I was taught that
God's designs for this world were complex, of course,
that they were not always in keeping with those of His
followers. I was taught that the ways of God were mysterious but that in the end all things were part of
God's design, that all things worked together for good.

And so I reflect on what it is I think
about God, on how I think about his
godliness. I was raised in a
religious family. My father was a
Baptist minister, a New Testament
professor at a Baptist seminary.

Certainly I was taught that God was omnipotent all powerful - that there was no aspect of this world
which He could not directly alter if it became part of
His design to do so; and that God was omniscient all knowing - that no aspect of existence in this world
escaped His knowledge. And as a child these teachings
were part of the security of my upbringing, to live in
a world which was presided over by a God who cared
for me, who knew my needs and who had the power
to protect me from evil.
But then I grew up. The kinds of self-doubt that
plague all teen-agers were aggravated in my case,
somewhat, by my family's two relocations between
1963 and 1965 and the result that I attended three
different high schools and seemed forever to be starting over at the task of making friends and developing
a social circle. Oddly, this was the period of my greatest religious devotion. My commitment to prayer has
never been greater. I beseeched God to deliver me
from my adolescent suffering. And by the time I
graduated from high school I was convinced that He
had.
My years in college, however, would see that devotion wither and then die. My social life was no longer
the problem. But all other aspects of my life were in
turmoil, and God now seemed deaf to all my prayers.
The moves my parents made when I was in high
school were the result of my father's declining professional fortunes. He was both a political and theological
liberal in a denomination noted for its staunch conservatism. By 1965 his career in teaching was over. By
1967 he was through as a Baptist. By 1968 my parents
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would divorce, their marriage destroyed in a domestic
tornado spawned by the hurricane demolishing
Father's professional life.
I took all these developments hard. For a time I
sought refuge in the old tenets that God's ways are
mysterious but that His grand design is at work in the
world, that all things work together for good. In that
light I sought, with increasing difficulty, to believe that
my father would somehow emerge from his trials
purer and better able to serve, stronger for his testing
in the purging fires of unwarranted suffering.
But as 1968 meandered on and my heroes Martin
Luther King and Robert Kennedy fell to senseless violence and Eugene McCarthy's message of peace and
redemption got lost in a nation flirting at once with
fascism on one hand and anarchy on the other, my
prayers took on a desperate, demanding quality. What
was God waiting for? When was he going to banish the
injustice that seemed to be crushing me and everything I believed in? 1968 was a fearful, fretful year in
my spiritual life. At some point my belief in God disappeared. But for a time I was too timid to admit it.
Then, in 1969, I made the bitter leap to avowed
atheism. The cause I remember with the clarity of a
deed in progress. The method was human logic. I
read an article in the newspaper about an event of inconceivable horror. Hurricane Camille had raged
through my native Gulf South. Somewhere along the
Mississippi coast, a young couple and their infant
daughter had been caught by the storm with only their
aluminum house trailer for shelter. Camille had
snatched that flimsy refuge in her 200-mile-per-hour
clutches and had flung it over a mile inland, upside
down into a ravine. The adults were killed instantly,
but, protected by her bassinet, the baby miraculously
survived. She lived, coroners somehow later determined, another forty-eight hours or so. And, they
judged, still living, she was feasted upon by maddened
river rats, crazed by Camille's flooding of salt water
into their freshwater habitat. What kind of God, I
asked myself, could allow such a thing?
And I was thus crushed by the illogic of such a notion as the God I had always been taught to believe in.
If God was indeed omniscient, then He certainly knew
of this little girl's circumstances. If He was omnipotent, then He possessed the power to have delivered
her from such an unspeakable fate. And if He was
merciful, was a caring, compassionate God, then He
would certainly have done so. What manner of being
with the power to have done so would have not?
There was no grand design imaginable, no process for
good possibly at work that required this obviously innocent child's unfathomable suffering. And so what to
make of a God who had allowed it?
October, 1987

I was forced, it seemed, to choose between one of
several unappealing alternatives. Either 1) God was
not omniscient and so didn't know about the incident,
or 2) He was not omnipotent and so, even if He knew,
was somehow limited in His ability to relieve her suffering, or 3) He both knew and had the power to save
her but chose not to and was, therefore, indisputably,
not good, compassionate, and merciful.
I recognized instantly that if either 1) or 2) were
true, then God was severely lacking in His crucial
quality of godliness. What kind of god is a weak and
impotent god? On the other hand, if 3) were true, if
God were callous or perhaps even cruel, then why in
the world was He worth believing in? And so I chose
a fourth option: God did not exist.
I drifted for some years in the spiritual void of this
grudging atheism, unable to solve Camille's riddle. I
took to blunting attempts to draw me into serious religious discussions with the quip that, like Ghandi, "I
might be Christian, except for Christians." But my
background made me uncomfortable with what it was
I no longer believed.
And I struggled, now, to answer new sets of questions that arose immediately upon God's demise. All
my life I had known to behave in a certain fashion:
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the way God would have me behave. I should keep the
Commandments. I should love my neighbor as myself.
I should do these things because God had created me,
had decreed these ways of behaving as good, would
reward me if I did, would punish me if I did not. But
what imperatives endured in the absence of God? Why
was hedonism not a perfectly appropriate response to
a world without God?
After a time I found answers to those questions , and
considerable solace, in a strain of Existentialism that
expresses itself in Albert Camus' The Plague. In that
book Camus erects a model of human life at its most
trying. Bubonic plague has broken out in the North
African city of Oran. The city is quarantined . The
citizenry is trapped. Deaths number in the hundreds
every day. The suffering of those afflicted is horrible.
And medical science is powerless to heal or save or
even alleviate pain.
The book's narrator and protagonist, Bernard
Rieux, is an Oran physician. He is also an atheist. He
regards the notion that the plague is an element of
God's will as spineless nonsense. But he is gradually
exhausted by his labors in fighting the plague. Nothing that he does makes a difference. He can't list a
single patient that he's been able to help.
Still, he keeps up his hopeless struggle against the
disease. He is incensed at those, black marketeers and
other agents of corruption, who make a profit from
the circumstances of the plague. He refuses to approve the determination of one acquaintance who
wants to escape. He rejects the surrender of another
who commits suicide. Choosing as his hero, Grand, a
physically weak and intellectually limited clerk who
possesses only "a little goodness of heart and the seemingly absurd ideal" to do everything in his power to
fight the plague, Rieux evolves a personal existential
ethic that requires humane action in a godless world.
It works this way: In a world without God, survival
is as logical as suicide, and survival's product, life,
however bleakly absurd, is superior because it is something while death is nothing. The only sensible imperative is to affirm life, to live in such a way as to support
those forces which promote life's dignity. Life may indeed be short, repetitive, painful, and purposeless, but
it is all we have.
Camus' metaphor for this approach to living he
based on the Greek myth of Sisyphus, the mortal who
rails at a divine order that requires his death . In the
myth, the gods punish Sisyphus by granting his wish
for eternal life and then condemn him to the singular,
repetitive, monotonous, exhausting, pointless job of
rolling a boulder up a hill, a hill too high to be overcome in a single day, a boulder which the gods viciously push back to the bottom at the end of every day
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when a spent Sisyphus pauses te rest. Camus posits
Sisyphus as a model for all human existence and then,
radically, challenges us to see Sisyphus as happy.
There is an attractive defiance in such an approach
to life. And it sustained me through the rough times
of the late Sixties and early Seventies. It is capable, I
think, of sustaining me still. In an injust world that
ends in certain defeat, there is something powerfully
compelling about an attitude that nonetheless refuses
to concede, that defies fate to the very end as does the
philosopher Bokonon in Kurt Vonnegut's Gat's Cradle,
whose response to a ruined world reads: "I would
make a statue of myself, lying on my back, grinning
horribly, and thumbing my nose at You Know Who. "

Existentialism sustained me through
the rough times of the late Sixties
and early Seventies. In an unjust
world that ends in certain defeat,
there is something powerfully
compelling about an attitude that
nonetheless refuses to concede.
But there is an unavoidable bleakness to this approach. And though I was sustained by Camus and
the Sisyphean model , I was also aware how its existential imperative, in the hands of writers, like Vonnegut,
for instance, can become less a bugle call to righteous
battle and more the resigned dirge of "So it goes." Defiance was adequate as a last resort, in other words,
but I frequently hungered for something more , something for the times when the anger that defiance requires is inappropriate.
And then into my world came a sixth or an eighth
or a tenth reading of Joseph Heller's magnificent
Catch-22 . In the midst of that reading, suddenly I
grasped something that I had never seen before.
Through the infectious laughter of Heller's dizzying
humor, quite abruptly, I understood the difference between belief and faith.
As a critic of a kind, who teaches Catch-22 to college
lit students, I had long been idly puzzled by the
novel's opening lines : "It was love at first sight. The
first time Yossarian saw the chaplain he fell madly in
love with him." I had always seen the chaplain as a
thoroughly secondary character in the book, a symbol
of religion's impotence to be meaningful in the modern world.
Chaplain A. T. Tappman is a likable, earnest, decent human being with a genuine concern for his fellows and an almost total incapacity to help them. But
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at the end of the novel, I realized this time, he does
something pivotal; he provides something that makes
all the difference. And thus I realized why it was that
Yossarian loved him and why he loved him "at first
sight."
As Catch-22 wends toward its conclusion, Yossarian
is caught on the horns of a wicked dilemma. Most of
his friends are dead, killed flying the exorbitant
number of combat missions required by Yossarian's
unscrupulously
ambitious
commander,
Colonel
Cathcart. Suffering from a version of battle fatigue,
Yossarian has unsuccessfully sought for months to be
rotated off combat status. With seventy missions under
his belt, twenty more than required by any other commander, Yossarian finally refuses to continue flying.
And coupled with Cathcart's reluctance to prosecute
him - Cathcart is afraid of the negative implications
for his own career such a prosecution might mean Yossarian's one-man mutiny threatens to spawn a revolution.
So Cathcart and his executive aide, Lt. Col. Korn,
fashion a deal that becomes Yossarian's great temptation: they offer to promote him, award him a new
medal, and send him home a hero. All he has to do
is collaborate with their plans to jump the required
number of missions from seventy to eighty - or even
higher. In Col. Korn's terms all Yossarian has to do is
"Like us." At first, selfishly, Yossarian agrees. But then
in an unrelated incident he's wounded, and while recuperating he reconsiders.
The novel reaches its climax with Yossarian in the
hospital, facing his several unappealing options, each
of which has been previously embraced by one of his
friends or acquaintances. Major Danby informs Yossarian that the deal is still on and that to make sure he
takes it, Cathcart and Korn have falsified a series of
documents indicting Yossarian for every offense from
blackmarketeering to espionage. Should he try to back
out, they plan to court-martial him without endangering themselves through a discussion of the number of
missions they've required.
At first Yossarian considers the response taken by
his friend Dunbar, who tried to enhance the seeming
length of his life through activities that bored him. "I
might stay right here in this hospital bed and vegetate," Yossarian tells Danby. But the strategy hasn't
worked for Dunbar who first lost his laugh and ultimately disappeared. Dunbar's lesson is that to cease
acting in the world is to cease being human. And mere
life without one's humanity is hardly worth having.
But the alternative of collaboration, like that embraced by former pals Wintergreen and Milo, Yossarian can no longer abide. "It's a way to save yourself,"
Danby counsels. But Yossarian knows better. He thinks
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of ihe friends such an action would betray. He thinks
of the way his compliance would be used to force
cooperation from others lacking his aggressiveness. He
doesn't employ such language, but he thinks about collaboration's implications for his soul. "It's a way to lose
myself, Danby," he concludes. "You ought to know
that."
Yossarian could, of course, agree to return to his
unit and fly more missions. But that is tantamount to
suicide. All of his friends who continued to fly are
now dead. Rejecting that, too, Yossarian arrives at the
end of his rope. Earlier in the novel he has contemplated a violent course, joining Dobbs in a plan to
murder Cathcart and Korn. But he has seen the way
in which violence gets instantly out of control as Dobbs
keeps adding potential victims to his death list and finally includes people Yossarian considers friends.
Thus his options now are jail for defiance, survival
through collaboration or inhuman vegetation, or
suicide. And none of them are acceptable. In despair,
Yossarian confides to Danby, "Then there is no hope
for us, is there?"
"No, no hope at all," Danby concedes.
But then into this attitude of despair, the novel's unquestioned low-point, bursts the chaplain "with the
electrifying news about Orr," Yossarian's former
roomie who was presumed drowned after his plane
crash-landed in the Adriatic. "Sweden," cries the chaplain. "It's a miracle, I tell you! A miracle! I believe in
God again. I really do. Washed ashore in Sweden after
so many weeks at sea! It's a miracle."
But Yossarian, who knew Orr best, sees the event in
slightly different terms. "Washed ashore, hell!" he declares. "He didn't wash ashore in Sweden. He rowed
there! He rowed there, chaplain, he rowed there."
"Well, I don't care!" the chaplain flings back with
undiminished zeal, "It's still a miracle."
And indeed it is. It's a miracle that refills Yossarian's
empty fuel tanks of hope. And he's launched back into
action. The example, of course, is absurd - that Orr
has rowed a rubber life raft from the Mediterranean
to the North Sea. And the action it inspires is equally
absurd. Yossarian decides upon a fifth, previously unconsidered, option, to join Orr in flight to Sweden.
For years I saw this ending to Catch-22 in purely
existential terms. There can be no question that Orr,
the alternative, is the book's Sisyphean figure. Like
Grand in The Pla[!;Ue he is a man of only modest
abilities, but a man with an unlimited capacity for perseverance. Like Sisyphus he is undaunted by the unending need to start over.
But then on this sixth or eighth or tenth reading of
Catch-22, I saw that something new. I saw that the
good news about Orr was brought by the chaplain, the
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man of religion, the man of the gospel. Yossarian may
not see Orr's purported salvation in the chaplain's
terms exactly. But he doesn't deny the chaplain's designation of Orr's survival as a miracle. And on the
basis of that miracle, Yossarian is himself revived.
So what does all this mean for me and my life? And
why do I think about it as I lie in a warm embrace
with my wife and contemplate my annoyance with a
God in whom I have trouble believing? I recall it
today, as I always do in such circumstances now, because it was understanding the implications of Catch22's end that brought me in from atheism's cold.
Following Camus' imperative to affirm life requires
a venture into the void. One chooses to act as Dr.
Rieux or Grand acts because one believes that life is
something whereas death is nothing. But there's no
unassailable logic to such a system. A nihilist could flail
its inconsistencies as surely as I, with Camille's riddle,
have religion's.
Who is finally to say that life is something? There
are certainly those willing to argue that life is worse
than nothing. The Existentialist conquers despair by
making up his own life-affirming rules and then striving to live by them. It requires only a tiny adjustment
to include in that process of rule-creating a belief in,
or better faith in, a God who cares for us and has the
knowledge and power to look out for us.
Does Yossarian know that Orr has safely rowed to
Sweden? How can he? What evidence does he have for
such an absurd notion? He has the chaplain's word.
Does Yossarian believe the chaplain? Who knows? But
he has faith in the chaplain's good news about a miracle. How do we know? He acts on it. And so does this
mean that Yossarian, too, finds safe harbor in Sweden? We don't know.
But we know that Yossarian has been saved all the
same because he has been reborn to action. And it
doesn't matter that his action is both absurd and based
on faith in the word of a chaplain about an event
which is itself absurd. For Yossarian is in every way
better off than he was when confronted with his series
of bleak alternatives. Adumbrating all the dangers
Yossarian faces if he tries to join Orr, Danby concludes that "It won't be fun."
But Yossarian disagrees. "Yes it will," he maintains.
Yossarian is saved by faith in a miracle. And today,
in my most recent hour of need, so am I. I am surrounded by miracles. Joseph Heller's Catch-22 is a
miracle. Life is a miracle. Most powerfully, love is a
miracle. My Sunday School teachers were right when
they told me that God is love. I would put it now: to
know love, is to know God.
And so buoyed by the miracle of love, I am saved
for still another day. My belief in God remains cloudy
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and troubled. But based on these miracles my faith in
God is growing stronger. I have long since chosen defiant survival over hedonistic collaboration or suicide.
I have simply added another absurd element to that
leap into the void. Given that nothing about human
life makes logical sense, having faith in a benevolent
God makes no less sense. And I like the notion of alliance with a being more powerful than I against those
forces in this world that sully life's dignity.

III
My wife stirs again and I know another day begins.
I hug her to me and I conclude. Love is a miracle yet
love most certainly exists. So I choose faith in the
miracle of God's existence and activity in the world,
too.
Acting on that faith, I will rise today. I will persevere. I will confront my employer. And I will save my
job. Or I won't. And if I do, that will be good because
I like it. And if I don't, that will be good because it
will give me more time to do other things I like. Regardless, I will have love's miracle. And it will propel
me to join Yossarian, rowing to Sweden.
Cl

Shaman
We bought seed packets from Woolworth's,
walking past the bell-shaped bird cage
where sea-green parakeets slept
on a wooden dowel, legs locked, heads
folded back. On our porch we planted
morning glories, which twisted shut
their amethyst petals against humid sun.
My mother tamed this weed of a flower,
trained it to trellice latticework.
Pinched between thumb and pointer,
blossoms popped with a squeeze
as secret air rushed out. She always said
that if I listened closely, they whisper
where tendrils next would take the,
the first name of the man I would marry.
It never happened, words on midges' wings
buzzing past my ears, hearing instead
wind in our plum tree too old to bloom
among milkweed pods where monarchs lay eggs.

Martha M. Vertreace
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Of Worth & Worry
Linda Ferguson
The freshmen have just recently
arrived. University officials of admissions, housing, financial aid,
and health services know much
about these students, individually
and collectively. And I know some
things no one else knows. At least
I know a little about the 621 of
them who over the summer sent
me mail. As the person currently
responsible for administering the
Freshman Seminar program, I receive their requests for seminar
placement. (The Seminar is a required course, but the topicsabout 30 each year-vary widely.)
It is not surprising, nor necessarily bad, that course descriptions
promising films and field trips will
draw well; nor is it surprising that
topics related to mass culture attract attention. The more abstract
and overtly intellectual courses do
fill , but slowly. (The card bearing
one young woman's preference for
a "popular culture" topic carried a
wistful annotation in a different
handwriting, indicating "father's
choice.")
The members of the class of
1991, I can tell you, are mildly interested in actors, animals, and art-
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ists. They are somewhat more interested in family relationships,
food, and the future; they value
mass communications and making
peace. They are shamelessly unconcerned with cultures and customs
other than their own. They are exceedingly interested in sports, comedy, working, love, and money.
Less predictable, but gratifying, is
their considerable enthusiasm for
ethical and theological issues.
And less predictable yet is the
overwhelming favorite: The Paranormal. Their choices are based on
descriptions provided by the professors . The "paranormal" course,
described in careful, non-sensational , academic language, promises
to be rigorous. What caused 250 of
the 621 respondents (about 40 per
cent) to list it among their five
choices, while only 172 (about 28
per cent) expressed preferences for
the "sports" topic?
A few years back, The Chronicle of
Higher Education reported results of
a study conducted at a university in
the east. Students were asked to list
their worries about the courses they
were commencing. Their teachers
were asked to predict what the students would list. Students' worries
bore little relationship to the professors' imaginings.
Teachers assumed that students
were worried that the lectures
would be boring, that the material
would be obscure, that the grading
would be harsh or unfair. Students,
however, said they worried about
whether they could handle the
quantity of work assigned, whether
the teacher would like them, and
whether they would win approval
of the other students.
It is the question-what are you
worried about?-more than the details of the study that affects my
own approa,ch to the first day of
my new courses and my thoughts
about the freshmen whose requests
I process. The eighteen-year-old
arriving on campus is probably

more concerned about whether his
roommate will be tolerable and the
dining hall food palatable than
whether the curriculum that awaits
will guide him to a coherent and
worthy interpretation of the world.
Is our job as teachers to make
our worries their worries? To make
them worry about what we worry
about or at least what we think they
should worry about? I am worried,
and appalled, that this year's
freshmen are more curious about
psychokinesis than about poetry or
progress or politics or people with
different colored skin (nine of the
641 listed the latter among their
five choices). But if I teach only
from the perspective of this worry,
my students will be unlikely to
share it. The disconnectedness of
liberal learning from life as today's
students live it (lamented loudly
and at length in Allan Bloom's The
Closing of the American Mind) will
have no hope of reattachment.
"What does it mean?" and "what
does it mean to me?" are questions
freshmen may not have learned to
distinguish. Perhaps their worries
seem removed from ours because
they express them only in an immediately personal way. Perhaps
"will the teacher like me?" is the
unlearned versiOn of "will the
teacher understand what I mean?"
Perhaps "will this be on the test?" is
a feeble attempt to ask "is it necessary for me to know this piece of
information in order to understand
what you intend to teach me next?"
The classroom-every classroom
regardless
of
"topic"-affords
sanctuary in which to practice expressing what one means and interpreting what others mean; in which
to participate in what J erome
Bruner has called "the spirit of a
forum, of negotiation, of the recreating of meaning"; in which to
find wonder and joy in the enterprise of learning. If I can remember this, I won't worry so
much.
••

••
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Pain Songs
Richard Maxwell
Written and directed by David
Lynch, whose previous pictures include Eraserhead, The Elephant Man,
and Dune, Blue Velvet has received
nearly unanimous acclaim. It is
probably the best-reviewed movie
of the last year-and-a-half, uniting
such grey eminences as Stanley
Kauffman and Pauline Kael with
younger critics like Steve Vineberg
and a host of TV sages. 1
To have pleased so many people
of such different sensibilities is
quite an accomplishment. However,
while Blue Velvet is a wonderful anthology of praiseable bits and
pieces, the question of how it works
as a whole has not been faced, not
yet. I want to suggest that this film
is more vacuous, more regressive in
its way than the standard studio
products to which it is being favorably compared. Blue Velvet is not so
much an escape from the Eighties
as a summation of this decade's
stupidest impulses.
One of the best moments in the
film-a moment that suggests its
potential strengths--occurs almost
immediately. We see a middle-aged
man watering the lawn ; knees
buckling, he collapses awkwardly
onto a bursting, spurting hose
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which not only suggests the stroke
or hemorrhage he has just had but
begins defining that mixed realm
of sex and death which will prove
to be Lynch's subject.
The stroke victim turns out to be
the father of Jeffrey Beaumont
(Kyle MacLachlan), a college-age
boy who returns home to take over
the family hardware business while
dad is in the hospital. Though not
by any means alone-he has a bevy
of female relatives whose twittering
sympathy is played for laughs-Jeffrey finds himself at something of a
loss; paternal authority eliminated,
or at least offstage, he will stumble
into a new and frightening family.
His father's collapse is visualized so
that it serves as a bridge: in a
dream-like way it sets the tone for
Jeffrey's descent into the underworld of this picturesque little
town .
Soon his descent begins in earnest. Walking through a field he
discovers a human ear. He drops
off the ear at the local police station, where a detective takes a calm
but steady interest in it; later Jeffrey runs into the detective's
daughter Sandy (Laura Dern) and
persuades her to help him investigate a singer, Dorothy Vallens
(Isabella Rossellini) who may have
some connection with the developing mystery.
While Sandy waits outside in a
car, Jeffrey explores Dorothy's flat
(she lives in the aptly-named Deep
River apartment building); peeking
out from a closet where he has
taken refuge, he sees her enter and
undress. Realizing that Jeffrey is
watching, Dorothy drives him out
of the closet and forces him to strip
at knife point; they are interrupted
by the arrival of Frank (Dennis
Hopper), the biggest pervert in
1

I will quote from Kael's review in
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town. Jeffrey is getting in deep.
Up to about this point Blue Velvet
had me. Everything is off-key, just
slightly, but the flat dialogue, the
over-saturated colors, and the fauxnaif presentation of small-town life
work together beautifully: in his
odd staggering swings between horror and the everyday, Lynch is getting somewhere strange very fast.
The first serious problem is Dennis Hopper's performance as
Frank. Hopper has thrived of late:
playing against an inflatable doll in
the disastrous River's Edge and
against a champion basketball team
in Hoosiers, he has managed to
chew up more scenery than the average stagehog gets to consume in
a lifetime. Lynch has Hopper do
his standard weird-guy number; it
doesn't suffice. The ravaged, sexy
Rossellini is so convincing as
Dorothy, the exploited masochist,
that Hopper's brutal clowning
palls; he's not committed enough! want to say not good enough-to
be the personification of evil, the
snake in the garden. He's an actor
e~oying his own hamminess rather
than a sadist enjoying the pain he
inflicts on Dorothy and others.
"Why are there people like
Frank?" Jeffrey asks Sandy; he
speaks in a quavering voice, appropriate for one who has recently
discovered the importance of
theodicies, but the movie is seriously out of joint in having him
formulate this query: he might as
well be asking, "Why are there
people like Bozo?" for all the resonance his question possesses.
I should note that Frank never
does live up to his evil potential, at
least within the central action of
Blue Velvet; during a crucial scene
midway through the film he is allowed a motive and a chance to inflict some sort of major erotic
humiliation on Jeffrey. Lynch's
imagination suddenly goes blank:
all he can come up with is a pathetic little kiss ritual, as if he too
The Cresset

realized that Frank, as interpreted
by Hopper, is all bark and no bite.
(I am reminded of Ron Moody's
lovable Fagin from the film musical
Oliver; however, Moody was at least
a genuinely seductive devil.)
If Lynch has serious difficulties
with the representation of evil, so
does he with the representation of
good. Sandy, the gorgeous, golden
virgin, is supposed to embody a
kind of moral strength founded on
mnocence and idealism. Laura
Dern is winning in this part but
Lynch does some odd things with
her. Sandy's big scene is a conversation she has with Jeffrey, while
they sit in a car parked in front of
a church. Behind them: glowing
stained glass windows. Behind
them:
subdued organ musiC.
Against these accompaniments, visual and aural, Sandy explains to
her panic-stricken friend that the
world will be saved by the arrival of
a thousand robins, scattering love
through all the world.
People who like this film are generally anxious to explain, or explain away, this sequence. It's
clearly not "camp," to use the Sixties term; Lynch is not constructing
a piece of ironically-intended
schlock which we then enjoy in a
condescending way (less for content
than for style). What's going on
here then? Steve Vineberg writes:
"as Laura Dern reads the lines, the
cliche is so intensified that it becomes joyful, and the emotional
color almost blinding." If we believe Vineberg, Lynch, the intuitive
emotional filmmaker, is feeling his
way into cliches, discovering the
truth that still lies nestled at their
heart despite the linguistic abuse of
centuries.
Pauline Kael would perhaps
agree with this-she refers to
Lynch as a Frank Capra of dream
logic-but she adds a slightly different twist to her discussion of the
robin scene. When Sandy babbles
on so ingenuously, the point is that
October, 1987

she has seen "too many daytime
soaps." The conversation in the car
is intended to expose her illusions.
Kael clinches her point by reminding us that Blue Velvet ends (happily, it would seem) with a robin arriving on a windowsill, a big juicy
worm in its mouth. Nature is cruel,
tooth and claw, etc.-not the benign presence our golden girl finds
it.
Kael is a bit more convincing
than Vineberg; however, that robin
at the end is rather obviously
mechanical, like a fugitive from the
Tiki House at Disneyland. The fact
is, Lynch has made so many cute
jokes, has demonstrated his knowingness so many different ways,
that Sandy's speech, her vision if
you will, ends up having no real
significance at all: it's idle doodling,
what an extremely kind and patient
critic might call "experimental."
This wavering and indulgent attitude prevails through most of the
film. Many of the later scenes are
out-and-out disasters, such as the
sequence where Dorothy turns up
naked in front of Sandy's house
just as Sandy and Jeffrey arrive by
car. When Kael and Vineberg insist
that Blue Velvet has some great
comic scenes, they must be thinking
of Jeffrey's difficulties at this moment (among others): how do you
explain to your girlfriend's mom
what an undressed woman with
whom you are on first-name terms
is doing in her living-room? 2
The problem is that Jeffrey, not
to mention Lynch, makes no real
attempt to solve this intriguing
problem. The actors go through
their paces as though they are trying to do an eighteenth-century
farce under the influence of sleeping pills. Here, as so often, the ef2
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feet is neither witty, weird, nor
even ... experimental. It's just underdeveloped.
There are some good moments
in Blue Velvet, even after the main
conflict has collapsed. Lynch gets
his best performance from Dean
Stockwell (the erstwhile child star
of Anchors Aweigh). Stockwell plays
Frank's friend Ben, a drug dealer
who is holding Dorothy's little boy
hostage in a sort of No Exit living
room populated by stoned fat
women. Made up like a vicious
Pierrot, Stockwell lip-synchs Roy
Orbison's melancholy tune "In
Dreams." (Orbison sings about "the
candy-colored clown they call the
sandman"-good theme song for
someone in Ben's profession.)
Lip-synching has long had a role
in our culture: think of the old
American
Bandstand-type
shows,
where a pop singer would appear
in person and then mouth the words
to his own hit song while the record played and a passel of teenagers danced. The separation of
body from voice is a form of selfalienation with which we're all
familiar, if not comfortable. Hearing Orbison's deep, quavery voice
while Stockwell mouths his words is
a memorable sensation nonetheless:
not quite American Bandstand, not
quite daemonic possession.
We can learn something from
this sequence about the lugubrious
parts of Fifties (and early Sixties)
teenage lore: Orbison, Presley,
James Dean, the whole overripe
mess. We can also learn something
about that falsest emotion, nostalgia, and its ability to give old idols
new life. Lynch encourages us to
cross a boundary line, one we may
have sensed was there, between Orbison's weepy self-pity and the cold
cruelty embodied here by Ben.
Stockwell's cameo delivers what
Blue Velvet so often promises: we
start with a seemingly innocent surface (the song) and find within it a
self-indulgent
corruption.
The
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problem is not that this sort of discovery is hackneyed: in the context
of 1980s Hollywood it is arguably
brave and valuable. Lynch's difficulty is just the opposite. For all
we've heard about the no-holdsbarred quality of Blue Velvet, the
film finally serves as a mechanism
of repression, repression, moreover, of a peculiarly mindless sort.
Vineberg insists that Lynch wants
to keep both idyll and nightmare
"in sharp focus, insisting with the
passion of a native surrealist that
they can co-exist." But-as I've argued-idyll and nightmare are resolutely out of focus, morally if not
literally.
A comment from another admirer, David Chute, comes a little
closer to the truth. "The picture
toys with the notion that happiness
is a matter of confining yourself
stubbornly to the sunny surface of
things, of not probing too deeply
into their wormy innards." Chute
has a point, although he doesn't
follow it through. Lynch prevents
himself from imagining fully the
nature of good or evil; this selfmystification allows him to work towards a happy ending which he
mocks and simultaneously wants us
to believe, robins and all. He is not
a naive surrealist so much as a
practitioner of doublethink.
At the end of Blue Velvet we're
left with one hero and only one:
the detective, Sandy's father, who
can work within a corrupt milieu
without being touched by it, who
becomes-as Jeffrey could notour protector. It is typical of Blue
Velvet that the thoughts, the experience, of our protector remain completely unavailable to us. Father
knows best ... but only so long as
he can remain a mysteriously distant, coolly benign figure .
Peter Brooks once constructed a
theory of melodrama according to
which the absurdities of this form
can be traced to confusion and anxiety about the disappearance of
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moral absolutes (The M elodramatic
Imagination: Balzac, Henry James,
Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess,
Yale, 1976). "We may legitimately
claim that melodrama becomes the
principal mode for uncovering,
demonstrating, and making operative the essential moral universe in
a post-sacred era." To put the
point another way, in a culture
where absolutes seem to have disintegrated , a sense of morality can be
restored through the operations of
terror. Brooks applies his theory to
works by Balzac, Henry James, and
others. Melodrama in his sense is a
term that includes high as well as
low art; James' apparent rejections
of melodrama contain themselves a
melodramatic component.
To some extent Lynch can be
understood as a melodramatistand in these terms even his worst
failures may seem excusable. Of
course he can't imagine characters
capable of embodying the forces of
good and evil he strives to imagine;
it is in the very nature of his cultural dilemma that-no matter how
hard he strives-his personification
will remain inadequate, that the
thing he is trying to express will remain partially unsaid . Of course he
must revert to dependence on an
arbitrary figure. The most desperate, the most excessive of genres,
melodrama necessarily works by
these equivocal means. I suspect
that some such argument lies behind a good deal of the critical
praise for Blue Velvet.
In one crucial respect, however,
the argument is unjustified. Balzac,
Dickens, even James, indulged in
the silliest of melodramatic conventions but almost always in tandem
with other energies. Lynch has reverted to a form of melodrama so
pure that it makes thinking impossible. Kael, Chute, and Vineberg
either state or imply that Lynch
doesn't need to think. Can they say
the same of themselves or of the
American polity at large?
Cl

My Nuclear
Summer Vacation
Paul H. Brietzke
Summertime is a time for the
refreshment of academics and, for
me, a chance to continue writing a
history of antitrust that progresses
all too slowly. I took a break from
this drudgery last summer to attend a week-long Institute for professors called "Regional Conflict
and Global Security: The Nuclear
Dimension." I hoped to reflect on
this important topic in my future
research and teaching, and I
learned much from the academics,
think-tank veterans, and former
government officials who addressed the topic from a variety of
perspectives and persuasions.
But I confess that I also hoped
to take advantage of the leisure
opportunities
freel y
available
where the Institute was held:
Madison , Wisconsin. No such luck.
A very thick book of xeroxed
readings arrived a month before
the Institute began . In Madison we
were kept strictly at our task from
9 :00 a.m. to 9 :00 p.m. each day,
and fell into bed exhausted soon
after. Somewhat resentful initially,
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I came away with something much
more valuable than r and r.
My initial reaction to the Institute was a "psychic numbing." I
had not previously given much credence to this description (by Robert
Jay Lifton) of typical reactions to
the nuclear peril. Although I had
read fairly widely on the subject,
my nuke-think was always interspersed with listening to the
stereo and teaching and other
everyday pleasures of a non-nuclear nature. Forced to concentrate
on nukes, I woke up each morning
grateful that Armageddon had not
arrived during the night. Maybe
you do this too on occasion or
maybe you should, if for no other
reason than to recognize how petty
are most other annoyances. What
follows is a summary of my reactions to Institute presentations.
The important message of the
Institute dawned on me gradually:
there is hope over nukes, even a
closely-reasoned hope. How can
this be, when we face a nuclear system so weird and dangerous that
not even Cap Weinberger or the
Rand Corporation could have designed it? The answer is that we
had our eye on the wrong ball the
whole time while searching for a
technological quick-fix or hoping
that the "experts" would know
what to do.
But experts persistently err while
as
a
defining
nuclear
war
technological rather than a political
problem. Their approach presumably reflects Einstein's observation
that physics is easier than politics.
We know that war is diplomacy by
other means (Clausewitz); the nuke
is merely war and diplomacy by still
more dangerous means. We can all
better understand the nuclear
menace as a species of politics and
then reject the passive role assigned
to us by the experts. We cannot
allow ourselves to be kept in the
dark while, at the same time, being
blamed for the "micro-manageOctober, 1987

ment" of military affairs which affect us all.
Expert assumptions about and
analyses of weapons and their underlying "scenarios" usually prove
dubious on closer examination.
The thrill of manipulating arcane
concepts is at work, the secret
handshake and the feeling of competence that offer a dangerous illusion of being in nuclear control.
Our experts are full of arrogance
and moral rectitude. Much of their
logic and supporting evidence
would be rejected as inadequate if
they had come from an undergraduate.

Nuclear weapons are
powerful but very blunt
diplomatic instruments
for the balancing and
dividing of power that
goes on constantly on a
worldwide basis.

Their expertise is not a good
enough basis for your survival and
mine. A cautious friendship with
the Chinese turned out to be a better solution than surrounding them
with nukes, which is what Defense
Secretaries Laird and Schlesinger
urged. Relations with the dreaded
Soviets could follow the same path;
a modus vivendi exists to be built
upon.
Regrettably perhaps,
nuclear
arms control is all but irrelevant to
peace; it merely serves to legitimate
the process of acquiring new
weapons. SALT limits on nukes did
not interfere with what we or the
Soviets wanted to do, and even a
"theater" (small) nuke can be fifteen times more powerful than the
Hiroshima bomb. Even if we ban
the bomb, the knowledge and
means of making it again quickly
will remain forever. We may as-

sume that a full-scale conventional
(non-nuclear) war would be a replay of World War II-terrible, but
most people would survive. Yet the
new conventional weapons are so
powerful and cruel that their widespread use would create the conditions many associate with a nuclear
war.
The focus should thus be on preventing and ameliorating conflicts
rather than on the arms themselves. MX and Star Wars are
dumb ideas but, their horrible cost
aside, they merit a low priority in
the debate. (Incidentally, Star Wars
was termed SDI during the Institute, even by its opponents, which
shows the power of governmental
public relations efforts that would
also turn the MX into the Peacekeeper.)
Nuclear weapons are powerful
but very blunt diplomatic instruments for the balancing and dividing of power that goes on constantly, worldwide. Pursuing a harmony of interests and an international cooperation have little to do
with this system of organized
peacelessness achieved through
militarization and, even in the U.S.,
internal repression. The assumption that militarization can be built
up selectively, incrementally, and
without nukes, to achieve security
for ourselves and our clients, is
regularly belied by unplanned proliferations of weapons and the attendant repression.
This is where our search for a
cheap and easy fix in nuclear diplomacy has taken us. Nukes were
supposed to decrease the probability of war and to decrease expenditures on defense and on war if it
began. Otherwise the Europeans
would have to maintain troops sufficient to fight the Soviets in a conventional war. World War III was
projected to resemble a World War
II plus nukes, and conflicts which
did not fit this model-the IraqIran War, for example-were
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either fuelled or forgotten. Only
recently have we sensed that our
situation is more like the prelude to
World War I: an oddball flashpoint
could very well lead up to the Big
One.
Nuclear strategy now leaves us
with a long series of prisoners' dilemmas; each of us is the prisoner,
the hostage to what almost any
country may do in an interdependent but nuclear world. The arms
race now manages us by ruling out
most potentially-useful ideas and
solutions to conflict, yet it does not
matter much whether or not we
build weapons of various types. We
feel the need to act tough, while
perhaps recognizing that doing so
may be a step towards Armageddon.
This is why Reagan's fondness
for "sending a message" devoid of
constructive content-in Nicaragua,
Libya, and who knows where or
what next-is so dangerous. We
cannot know what the Soviets, et al.
will perceive in our actions. They
do not consider themselves the
"bad guys" of some old cowboy
movie, who must back down after
we slap them around a bit. We cannot be sure that the Soviets will foment the problem for which we are
creating the solution, but we can
bet that our solution will become
their problem. They will then
create a solution which becomes
our problem, and so on, which is
what we call deterrence.
There is far too little public discussion and understanding of deterrence, the key concept that,
more than anything else, reflects
the poverty of our imagination concerning nukes and strategy generally. Deterrence assumes an ethnocentric and hyperrational, Benthamite calculation of war's pains and
pleasures. It supposedly increases
the pain (through, e.g., escalation)
and reduces the pleasure (through,
e.g., the scorched-earth policy that
nukes make so likely), while ignor-
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ing the irrationalities and accidental
features that shape so much of history (e.g., the improbably long
series of coincidences we remember
as Adolf Hitler). If deterrence has
failed so spectacularly in our penology, if the same crooks keep returning to jail, how can we expect
deterrence to work under an international lawlessness where misbehavior is so often rewarded so
well?
"Effective" deterrence means giving up democratic, and even presidential, controls over weapons and
actions. "Better Dead than Red"
can eventually become "Better Red
than Red," as we imitate the enemy
until he becomes us. (If this sounds
fanciful, consider what has happened to the Israelis in recent
years.)

Perhaps the main defect
of the idea of deterrence
is that it offers no
solutions once nuclear
war begins. Yet we deem
it a part of "thinking
the unthinkable."
Third World peoples and, increasingly,
Western
Europeans
realize that the nuclear deterrence
"umbrella" is quite small. We will
not knowingly risk our population
to save theirs, and the proliferation
that supposedly augments their
self-defense thus proceeds apace. A
superpower stalemate encourages
instability and conflict in the Third
World, as each superpower gives in
to the desire to flex its muscles by
egging on client-states and "liberation" movements.
"No more Koreas" has gone the
way of the more ennobling desire
to "make the world safe for democracy." Perhaps the main defect of
deterrence is that it offers no solu-

tions once nuclear war begins. Yet
we deem it a part of "thinking the
unthinkable."
I have not discussed the Soviets
much, for the simple reason that it
is easier to influence our government than it is to influence theirs.
But we can take some comfort
from the notion that, by and large,
Soviet behavior is more cautious
and conservative than ours. We are
the only ones to have used nukes
for other than diplomatic purposes:
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which
seemed to flow logically from the
1942 Allied decision to bomb civilian populations.
Each significant technological escalation has come from us rather
than the Soviets: the A-bomb, the
H-bomb, MIRVed warheads, and
now Star Wars. So far, the Soviets
have backed down in direct confrontations-the Berlin and Cuban
Missile Crises, for example-while
we have always left open the option
of nuclear escalation. In contrast to
our behavior over Vietnam, the
Soviets in Afghanistan have not
harmed Pakistani dissidents or
bombed or invaded Pakistan in hot
pursuit.
Soviet strategy is devoted to winning a conventional war without
using nukes, although chemical and
biological weapons may be used;
NATO is committed to using nukes
if its key positions are overrun.
The Soviets keep their nuclear
weapons at a lower state of readiness than ours because they fear a
loss of control. For example, the
KGB keeps most nuclear missile
warheads and stores them apart
from the launchers controlled by
the military. Our electronic failsafe
mechanisms may be better than
theirs, but ours will be removed
during a time of high alert-the
time when they are needed most.
These propositions may irritate
Americans who want to believe that
we are more cautious and pacific
than the Soviets. But we would all
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presumably agree on the need to
improve our performance and our
chances of survival, by working to
cut the paths to war. A deliberate
nuclear war out of the blue is too
unlikely to worry about, although
thinking about this particular unthinkable regularly serves to justify
increases in our defense budget.

There is no technological
fix for the most likely
path to nuclear war: a
political decision to
initiate actions without
predicting their
consequences correctly.

An accidental nuclear war is a
distinct possibility, however. The
actions and reactions of both sides
are so interlinked that we could
have an electronic version of World
War I. A 75 cent computer chip
may fail and prompt a nuclear war,
or a computer program-which
cannot be debugged under "realistic" conditions-may run amok.
There have been some 1,500 false
alarms since America's various alert
systems were built. These alarms
have been properly disregarded,
occasionally with only seconds to
spare, but a serious crisis could
cause an ambiguity to be interpreted in favor of launch.
There is a useful but very limited
role for a technological fix here, although increased
technological
sophistication (e.g., Star Wars) automatically multiplies the opportunities for accident. Improved
consultative devices like the independent monitoring and warning
system proposed by the French,
staffed by the Soviets and ourselves, seem a good idea.
There is no technological fix for
the most likely path to nuclear war:
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a political decision to initiate actions without predicting their consequences correctly, an escalation
taken on the assumption that the
other side will back down ~ Conflict
and escalation truncate choices,
presenting political leaders (or military commanders, if civilian control breaks down) with either/or decisions-prisoners' dilemmas with a
ratchet effect, as in the "use 'em or
lose 'em" syndrome.
Naval warfare, for example,
creates the overwhelming pressure
to fire first. A single hit can sink a
nuclear-capable ship, which is thus
not made subject to elaborate civilian controls. Anyone with a Silkworm or an Exocet can thus help
steer naval battles in a nuclear direction.
The only real protection we have
is the "firebreak" that lies between
conventional and nuclear war. It is
composed of nothing more than
the belief that nuclear war is immoral and the pragmatic sense that
we do not know how to fight one
with any degree of safety. It is
perhaps Reagan's major sin that he
has shrunk this firebreak by trying
to blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear war.
If an unthinking, step-by-step es-

calation to nuclear war occurs, the
most likely venue is somewhere in
the Third World. Europe is tense
but fairly stable, while there is
much recent conflict in the Middle
East, South and Southeast Asia,
and
southern
Africa.
(Latin
America is a ''nuclear-free zone,"
and tended to be disregarded during the Institute for this reason.)
The proliferation of conventional
weapons and nuclear technologies
creates a clear and present danger
of exacerbating and then escalating
regional conflicts, conflicts into
which Soviets and Americans are
all too easily drawn.
Third World military expenditures now total more than expenditures there on health and education combined. The Third World's
big spenders perpetuate underdevelopment and experience conflict
as causes and effects of militarization and internal repression. Yet
the ensuing conflicts appear to justify earlier weapons acquisitions.
(The top eight countries account
for more than 50 per cent of
worldwide expenditures on arms
imports; they are, in order, the
conflict-prone Iraq, Egypt, Iran,
Syria, Libya, India, Israel, and
Vietnam.)
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There was much else in Institute
presentations which exceeds the
scope of this column: an American
feminist perspective, and illuminating details and revealing histories
of regional conflicts and superpower responses. Particularly disturbing is the exacerbation of conflicts by religious fundamentalisms:
Islamic, of course, but also Jewish,
Maronite Christian (Lebanon), and
even Hindu and Sikh--evolutions
away from Nehru's secular state
which began when Indira Gandhi
discovered the power of communal
voting.
We must prepare to deal with
their and our fundamentalisms
peacefully, and with the possibility
that Lebanon is the wave of the future. We must also lift the burden
of history before we can lift the
burden of weapons, by seeking to
understand the dynamics and consciousness that have led to the
present morass. A revived Wilsonianism, an unpreparedness at
Pearl Harbor, and the appeasement
at Munich still dominate our thinking and are badly in need of updating and revision. Reagan seems to
think that he is standing up to Stalin.
So many problems; what can be
done? If George Orwell was correct, we must speak and write
clearly before we can think clearly
about nukes. One Institute lecturer
carefully underscored the obfuscatory nature of our nuclear language. Consider, for example, the
reversal of sentient and insentient
matter that operates to conceal the
fact that war is a contest of injury
to human bodies.
Nukes are personified-they live
in "families," become "disabled,"
and "kill" each other ("fratricide,"
if they are from the same family)while people are depersonalized
when, for example, their death in a
nuclear exchange is called "collateral damage." Having built a bomb,
India is said to have lost its nuclear
24

"virginity." New Zealanders are
made to sound foolish when their
banning of our nuclear-capable
ships is described as "an attempt to
regain their virginity." Graphic images are linked to loose public-relations talk, and euphemisms take us
far from reality in an effort to
make us love the inherently unlovable bomb.

So many problems; what
can be done? If George
Orwell was correct, we
must speak and write
clearly about nukes
before we can think
clearly about them.
We must think pragmatically and
morally about the bomb to overcome the "crackpot realism" (C.
Wright Mills) which too often prevails. Methodists and the Catholic
bishops are doing a good job, and
we may want to help the Lutheran
Peace Fellowship gain influence.
Scientists must devise their own
Hippocratic Oath, enforced by the
opprobrium of colleagues if nothing else. Each weapons system is a
reflection of our social system, of
what we apparently want and will
pay for. If you do not like the reflection of yourself in the weaponry
mirror, work for change.
Our undemocratic national security state breaks down periodically,
over Vietnam and the Iran-Contra
fiasco. Breakdown offers an opportunity for Congress and even ordinary citizens to reassert a measure
of sanity and control, and to begin
building a consensus. It is simply
not true that peace groups have
no interest in security and that
hawks do not care for peace. They
differ over perceptions of where
danger lies, and their differences
can be narrowed with careful

analyses of accurately-reported
facts .
Each president's feet must regularly be held to the fire over
foreign and arms policy. They
must all be stopped from thinking
unilaterally, given the dangerous
weapons our rivals hold. Each administration must be forced to
build on a national-security program which adequately reflects national interests and aspirations. The
firebreak between conventional and
nuclear war must be strengthened;
firebreaks against the escalation of
regional conflicts must be created.
Our relations with particular countries must be thought through carefully , so that we need not respond
to events with ad hoc frolics.
We also need to rethink our patron-client relations with Third
World countries, relations which
often echo the feudal politics on
which they are based. To do this,
we must come to terms with public
nationalisms and yearnings for social democracy in the Third World.
The failure to understand these
movements leaves us dealing with
tiny elites who practice the repression
and
the corrupt state
capitalism that guarantee their
downfall, and that offer much public relations ammunition for the
Soviets in the meantime. If we
know the endpoint-majority rule
in South Africa, some territory for
Israelis in the Middle East-we
must work at peaceful means to accelerate the transition. Finally, we
must patiently re-educate our military so that they prevent wars
rather than merely win them.
All concerned citizens should
have the opportunity to go through
something like the Institute at
Madison. Most will not have this
opportunity, and I thus potted up
my reactions to the Institute as an
imperfect substitute. No issue is
more worth thinking about and acting upon, and I wish you both the
concern and the joy of it.
Cl
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But Will It Play
In New York?
John Steven Paul
Last spring I proposed to the editor of this journal that I review
next season's Broadway hits while
they were in out-of-town tryouts.
Besides, I said, with super-saver
fares, a trip to London would cost
well under a thousand dollars, including a pub crawl or two. No way.
Knowing my editor's political inclinations (I read In Luce Tua, too),
I suggested that the primary purpose of the trip would be to cover
those crucial days leading up to
Maggie Thatcher's historic thirdterm victory, and then to see a bit
of theatre on the side. "As long as
you keep your expenses within the
range of your column fee," he said,
" ... and see if you can get an interview with Kinnock."
So, confident that my in-flight
cocktails would be fully subsidized,
I journeyed to the New York
theatre's most important out-oftown try-out spot: London (Eng.).
En route our little 747 passed two
huge British military transport
planes, straining to stay aloft. They
may have been on a resupply mission to the Falklands, but my guess
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is that they were conveying parts of
the scenic apparatus for the New
York engagements of Les Miserables
and Starlight Express.
Starlight Express is Andrew Lloyd
Webber's Uesus Christ Superstar,
Evita, Cats) tribute to popular culture. If you can imagine a combination Ringling Brothers, roller
derby, and rock concert set in a
roundhouse
spiraling
railroad
above your head, then you deserve
the opportunity to experience Starlight Express. The plot won't overtax your intellectual resources, unless you thought "The Little Engine
That Could" was a difficult text.
It is difficult not to be amazed by
the performances of the actor-athletes who impersonate locomotives
and railroad cars. Simultaneously
singing, dancing, and speeding on
roller skates around a triple-deck
track, they try futilely to keep from
being absorbed by the scenic spectacle and drowned out by electronic
amplification.
In the London production, black
actors play the little steam engine
and members of his family. Ultimately, the little steamer defeats
the super trains and bullet trains
from France and Japan. These
locomotives are played by whites.
Political message? Unfortunately,
all the locomotives are played by
men, while women play dining cars
and cabooses. Social message? Inexplicably, divine aid comes to the
little steam engine in the form of a
starship-cum-locomotive, riding the
rails of the title tune. This mysterious, omnipotent force is the "Starlight Express." Religious message?
Starlight Express is excessive but
not pretentious. For pretentiousness you go to the Royal Shakespeare Company's production of
Les Miserables at the Palace Theatre.
The size of the authorial committee
that fashioned Victor Hugo's epic
novel of 1861 into a musical makes
it impossible to list its members
here. Like Starlight Express, Les Mis-

erables has b~en directed by Trevor
Nunn, whose directorial signature
currently insures the success of any
show produced on either side of
the pond.
In Paris, London, and now New
York, "Les Mis," as the in-crowd
call it, has become a must-see for
those who want to be counted
among the internationally chic. But
theatre-goers who require more
than super-spectacular size in a
show may well be disappointed.
Even the RSC's superb performance cannot help the music,
which is simple-minded, thin, and
repetitive. And, as in nearly all musicals now, the amplification distorts rather than enhances the actors' natural voices.
Beware the production whose
program is stuffed with notes
clarifying the plot: it means the
play can't speak for itself. Despite
the many program notes, I found
Hugo's compelling saga of Jean
Valjean, Inspector Javert, Fantine,
and Cosette difficult to follow in
the "Les Mis" adaptation. The massive production nearly drowned the
plot, and distanced us utterly from
the characters which Hugo offered
up for our empathy. Unlike Trevor
Nunn's captivating Nicholas Nickleby,
"Les Mis" promotes no central
character with the ethos, pathos,
and charm of Charles Dickens'
Nicholas. We encounter Hugo's
Jean Valjean as more part of the
spectacle than half of the conflict.
Even under the masterful manipulation of Nunn, the illusion fails to
take shape.
Nunn and his production team
have filled the gaps in the script
with massive scenery and a cast of
thirty. Some of the scenery is startingly impressive (as are the production costs) and some of the effects
are magically theatrical. When, for
instance, the police detective Javert
jumps from a bridge to his suicidal
death, the bridge flies up and away
from the actor and lighting trans-

25

forms the stage floor into a swirling
eddy. But it's hardly worth a trip to
London to see scenery--or even to
New York, where the show promises to play for a long time.
By almost any measure, the
Royal Shakespeare Company leads,
even
dominates,
the
English
theatre. The company, founded in
1961, is based at the Royal Shakespeare Theatre in Stratford-uponAvon. While producing Shakespearean plays for the nation is one
of its principal missions, the company is equally famous for its productions of the entire range of
world drama, and for new plays.
With its three theatres in Stratfordupon-Avon, two theatres at the
Barbican Center in London, and
the various spaces it hires on a temporary basis, there is almost always
a landmark RSC production available to the foreign visitor.
And increasingly, the RSC takes
its plays on global tours. The production of Les Liaisons Dangereuses,
by Christopher Hampton, premiered at The Other Place, the
RSC's flexible space in Stratford,
moved on to the Pit theatre at the
Barbican Center, and then, under
independent management, to The
Ambasadors Theatre in the West
End. Last summer, it too arrived in
New York.
Les Liaisons Dangereuses is Christopher Hampton's dramatization of
the
epistolary
novel
by
an
eighteenth-century soldier, inventor, and revolutionary, Choderlos
de Laclos. Set in the decade prior
to the Revolution, Les Liaisons
traces the salacious saunterings of
Le Vicomte de Valmont and his
compatriot La Marquise de MerFor
Laclos,
the
two
teuil.
epitomized a segment of the
French aristocracy that had little
other than seduction, conquest,
ravishment, and ruination to occupy its time.
To retrace the labyrinthine plot
would only get us all hopelessly
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tangled up in noms de famille. Suffice it to say that Vicomte and the
Marquise treat virginity and chastity not as virtues, or even as matters of consequence, but as tokens
in a game to be won or lost, traded,
protected, forfeited or discarded as
the changing circumstances of play
dictate. That such virtues are treasured by persons less adept at the
game than they is cause for little
more than an occasional exchange
of quizzical glances. Ultimately, the
two desire each other. They resist
the impulse to declare their affection lest such declaration bring one
under the power of the other.

Lately, and happily,
there is word that

Breaking the Code, by
Hugh Whitemore, will
be opening at the Kennedy
Center in Washington.
It is nearly as gratifying, and less
dangerous for them, to exercise
their power over other, weaker
subjects. At the behest of the Marquise, the Vicomte cooly deceives
and deflowers a teenage bride-to-be
so that the Marquise can have her
revenge on the bride's intended, a
man who had once had the best of
the Marquise. And for his own
amusement, the Vicomte strives to
spoil the virtue of the most religiously chaste wife in France.
Their skillful and stylish scheming-a monstrous blend of cool
moral detachment and heated competitive engagement-mark the
Vicomte and the Marquise as more
than merely despicable specimens
of a decadent class, but as incarnations of a parasitic evil that must be
eradicated. For a good portion of
the performance, their outrageously cynical attitudes and callous
actions tickle the audience. But
when the end is near, the young

girl ruined, and the good wife compromised, the warm yellow sunshine streaming through the windows turns cool and the creamy
bed linens go grey. The chuckling
in the auditorium wanes, and even
the Vicomte seems fazed by the
corruption of it all. By then, the
shouts of the J acobins can almost
be heard in the distant half-decade
hence, and they are welcome.
Lindsay
Duncan and
Alan
Rickman, as the Marquise and the
Vicomte, move silkily about highceilinged salons and bed chambers.
Designer Bob Crowley has done
them up all in buff and cream and
blonde wood, masking the blackness of Valmont and Merteuil's
machinations. The rooms are inundated by cloth: tousled bed clothing, hastily discarded lingerie, and
layers of lavish costume. Submerged in all the fabric are the
weapons and the spoils of the sex
wars. Yet, though layers and layers
of costume come off in the fray,
there finally is no flesh to be seen
in this fleshly play.
Lately, and happily, there is
word that Breaking the Code, by
Hugh Whitemore, will be opening
at
the
Kennedy
Center in
Washington, moving subsequently,
one hopes, to New York. Derek
Jacobi will play the leading role of
Alan Turing.
Breaking the Code is comprised of
seventeen scenes in the life of Alan
Turing. Turing, a mathematician,
served with the British Foreign Office's code-breaking team at Bletchley Park during the Second World
War. Turing managed to break the
Germans' "Enigma" code-against,
by his own estimate, 50,000-to-one
odds-by inventing a machine to
survey and test "thousands of millions" of coded permutations in a
matter of hours. As a researcher at
Manchester University after the
war, he invented the digital computer, the "electronic brain."
Turing was a homosexual who
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lived a relatively unguarded private
life. Thus, of course, he broke the
English social and moral codes as
well as the German Enigma code.
After his term of service, the Government valued Turing and feared
him. In the authorities' view, his
status as a former intelligence officer made him a walking vault of
top-secret security information; his
homosexual lifestyle made him untrustworthy, unstable, and an easy
mark for blackmailers.
It was determined that Turing
would have to be "kept in touch."
If he did not regularly contact the
authorities, they would maintain
surveillance of him. But Turing's
freedom meant more to him than
his life. He committed suicide in an
R.A.F. hanger on June 7, 1954.
Whitemore based his play on the
book Alan Turing, The Enigma by
Andrew Hodges, and brought to it
the sharpness and clarity of a
documentary life. The scenes are
answers to a question: how did this
enigma named Alan Turing come
to be? And so we are shown the
spectacle of a consciousness being
formed, of a mind being programmed.
Formative influences include an
intense friendship with a schoolmate and kindred intellectual spirit,
and the friend's untimely death at
school of tuberculosis; the pronouncements of an anti-science
school teacher; a mother's failure
to demonstrate affection; philosophic and scientific maxims passed
on to him by colleagues and mentors; even the movie Snow White
and the Seven Dwarfs.
Whitemore frames the play with
a police investigation . Turing's
Manchester apartment has been
burglarized by an occasional lover
and his accomplice. Turing reports
the crime to the police, though he
must know that the investigation
will expose his lifestyle. When the
police discover Turing's connection
to the burglar, he is dispatched to
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prison on a charge of gross indecency.
It is Derek Jacobi's brilliant performance that draws this loosely
structured, episodic script together.
The scenes from Turing's life cover
the years between age seventeen
and forty-two . Without character
make-up or significant costume
change, Jacobi communicates the
subtle physical and behavioral
changes that accompany maturation.
Jacobi grounds Turing's essential
restlessness, diffidence, arrogance,
and pre-occupation in a single
habitual action: fingernail biting.
Throughout the evening, the
actor's hands are rarely removed
from his mouth. Combined with his
stuttering, and the wandering of

his glances away from those who
would fix his attention, the nailbiting is exhausting to watch. But
Jacobi's artistic magnetism prevents
the spectator from looking away.
Breaking the Code is a play about
reason and reasoning. Appropriately, Jacobi's intellectually acute performance is supported by an utterly stark and razor-sharp production, directed by Clifford Williams.
Williams, like many English directors, has been strongly influenced
by Brechtian theatre practice. The
audience is kept alert by various
theatrical means. The illumination
is white; the performers remain at
the sides of the stage when they are
not in action, and when they come
out for a scene they are plucked
out of a vast open stage space and

Dialogue of an Aged
Couple at Sorrento
HE:

There will be neither songs nor castanets
In the still night that follows the long day.
No leaf will stir. No telltale swirl of dust
Will touch the darkened earth where sunlight lay.

SHE: And will there be no music from the fountain
Whose silver note outlasts the dryest season?
Will there be silence where the water flowed?
Will lizards hold their breath without a reason?
HE:

Reason enough that everything grows weary
Of sun and burning heat that cracks the earth.
We weary also from our day of birth
And wearily we wait and long for darkness.

SHE: Today a ray of light slipped through that vine,
Touched a cool stone within the thickest shade,
Changed the dark moss to glowing emerald green.
One dewdrop flashed. The deepening shadow
Made flash of gold and blue seem ever brighter.
The night may come, but I am not afraid.

Raymond P. Fischer
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set in high contrast to the dark
metal walls. The furnishings are
very spare and have been selected
and placed only because they
clarify action. After a good while
one comes to realize that the
vaguely-defined setting is actually
the airplane hanger where Turing
will commit suicide.

Turing was obsessed with
the idea that everything
in nature could be
rationally understood and
mechanically calculated.
Alan Turing was obsessed with
the idea that everything in Nature
could be rationally understood and
mechanically calculated. While he
could solve the riddle of the
Enigma Code, he was not able to
bring about acceptable congruence
between his thinking self and his
feeling self. He sought pure intellectuality, but he could not be free
of his own desires. At the moment
he took his life, conjectures Whitemore, he was seeking to know if
mental processes might continue
free of a living body. At the last,
Jacobi stood, as near to pure intellect as a corporeal being could be,
alone in that vast space, contemplating an apple tainted with
cyanide.
I could not end this survey of
London's theatre in the spring of
1987 without mentioning yet
another
Trevor
Nunn-Royal
Shakespeare Company production.
This is The Fair Maid of the West,
written by Thomas Heywood sometime around 1600. It plays at London's Mermaid Theatre and will
surely not come to New York. This
is a pity, because The Fair Maid is
one of the most joyous theatre experiences that can be had anywhere.
The play owes its success partly
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to a more than adequate story of
one Bess Bridges, who ships out on
the high seas to rescue her lover
from untold catastrophes: pirates,
Spaniards, Mohammedans, in short
every bugaboo that threatened the
psychological peace and security of
Englishmen in the seventeenth century. The old play has been given
new and delightful music by Shaun
Davey. The RSC actors, of course,
are at their best in an English clasSIC.

More than plot, characters, language, music, or spectacle, the
Nunn-RSC Fair Maid of the West
succeeds by embracing its audience
and inducing it to share in the act
of creation. As we entered the Mermaid, its stage gotten up to represent a tavern, we were served ale
by members of the acting company.
From that point on, our fortunes
were bound up with those ale-quaffers on stage. And when a poor little touring company arrived at the
tavern and set up for a stuffy production of Henry V, we joined with
the tavern's patrons in booing
Shakespeare down and calling for
our favorite-little did we know it
then-The Fair Maid!
Throughout the Mermaid evening, we enjoyed what theatre historians have singled out as the
hallmark of London Theatre in the
time of Elizabeth I and James 1:
the oneness of actors and audience
as participants in the theatre event.
It is a testimony to Trevor
Nunn's versatility, I hope, and not
to his bad judgment, that he could
have directed The Fair Maid, Les
Mis, and Starlight Express. Audiences at the latter shows were removed so far and by so many
forces from the performers that
they might as well have been
watching a screen. (In fact, significant parts of Starlight Express are on
video screens.) In any case, I note
that London, try-out town that it
may be, still keeps its best shows at
home.
Cl

Review Essay

How Do Lutherans
Read the Bible?
Walter Keller

The Concordia
Self-Study Bible
St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House. 1,974 pp. $34.95.

Every October Lutherans celebrate the Reformation and thereby
annually raise the issue of Lutheran
self-understanding
and
identity. It all began-so we remind
ourselves-when in the context of
the reigning medieval penitential
piety Martin Luther discovered
evangelically-motivated repentance
and faith in the Gospel. The Gospel of the grace of God through
faith in Jesus Christ thus also became a critical principle against the
abuses of theology and piety in the
medieval church. In the ensuing
controversies which led to his excommunication from the papal
church Luther found himself relying increasingly upon the Bible
against the claims of the Church
and its councils. But when con-
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fronted later by the more radical
reformation movements, Luther's
appeal to the Bible became more
nuanced
historically
and
ecclesiologically.
A Lutheran understanding of the
Bible, therefore, is enormously
complex and notoriously elusive, as
the history of Lutheranism in this
country during the 1970s amply
documents. It is not always clear,
nor is there any unanimity on, how
best to adjudicate the many claims
that are made by evangelical concerns, ecclesiological concerns, and
historical and critical concerns. One
matter is quite clear, however; it is
utterly naive to traffic in pious
sloganeering with phrases like,
"Bible alone," or its close kin,
"Scripture, not tradition." The
plain, though often unacknowledged, fact is that the Bible never
did stand alone; it has always been
embedded in some supporting context and carried along in one or
another tradition, whether ecclesiastical or cultural.
The question of a Lutheran relationship to the Bible is raised
again by the appearance of The
Concordia Self-Study Bible (CSB) last
year. "The Concordia Self-Study
Bible is a Luthern (sic!) edition of
the NIV Study Bible." So reads the
first sentence of the Foreword to
the CSB. The impulse to publish
such an edition goes back to the
growing popularity of the New International Version (NIV) of the
Bible. It was rapidly commending
itself around the English-speaking
world as an excellent translation,
not only for classroom work, but
also for devotional and liturgical purposes, in the process becoming attractive as well to large
numbers of Lutherans, who also
used it for personal and corporate
worship.
Then the NIV Study Bible (NSB)
was published in 1985, furnished
with 20,000 notes to the text, introductions and outlines to each of the
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books of the Bible, 82,000 cross
references, plus charts, maps, essays, and comprehensive indexes.
Altogether it represented a splendid achievement of conservative
evangelical
biblical scholarship,
placed into the service of lay Bible
study. But for all that it posed a
problem for Lutherans; for, although the NSB draws upon the
heritage of the Protestant Reformation, it is not at certain crucial
points Lutheran in its orientation.
The CSB addresses itself to that
problem. As the Foreword explains: "The notes have been
edited and revised to provide a distinctively Lutheran emphasis."
The CSB shares with the NSB
something of a Protestant embarrassment that a study Bible should
be needed at all. It is the tender
conscience formed by the Protestant slogan "Bible alone" which
provokes CSB, following NSB, to
ask: "Why a study Bible when the
NIV text itself is so clearly written?
Surely there is no substitute for the
reading of the text itself; nothing
people write about God's word can
be on a level with the word itself.
Further, it is the Holy Spirit
alone-not fallible human beingswho can open the human mind to
the divine message."
The CSB, again echoing the
NSB, then justifies a study Bible by
stating that "the Spirit also uses
people to explain God's word to
others," appealing to the experience of the Ethiopian in Acts 8:31,
who was unable to understand the
Bible until Philip interpreted for
him. However that incident does
more than merely allow for a study
guide; it argues quite forcefully
against the slogan "Bible alone" by
pointing to the necessity of an accredited, Spirit-filled guide to the
Scriptures. And even though the
NSB is the work of a trans-denominational team of biblical scholars,
all of whom confess the authority
of the Bible as God's infallible word

to humanity, and who have sought
to provide clarity, appreciation, and
insight into that word, it still does
not come out Lutheran enough.
Neither the Bible alone, nor the
Bible as interpreted by the committed Protestant scholars of the NSB,
have succeeded in presenting the
Bible in a Lutheran way. That deficiency the CSB sets out to remedy.
The CSB is therefore an important publication. It represents the
attempt of its four editors (Robert
G.
Hoerber, General Editor;
Horace D. Hummel, Walter R.
Roehrs, Dean 0 . Wenthe, Associate
Editors) to define in a practical way
a Lutheran understanding of the
Bible. At first glance it might seem
that they have superimposed a Lutheran theology upon the Bible;
where the NSB failed to get Lutheran theology out of the Bible,
here some Lutherans simply
poured it in from the outside. But
the Lutheran confession has always
been that all theology, including its
own, must be drawn-at least seminally-out of the Bible.
So the CSB begins with an Introduction in which the editors list six
doctrines which "govern the interpretations that distinguish this
edition," but in which they argue
that these doctrines are not Lutheran creations, but grow out of a
reading of the Scripture. We thus
find ourselves in the middle of the
hermeneutical circle: certain "preunderstandings" govern the interpretation of the Bible, and that
interpretation in turn reinforces
the original prior point of view.
The importance of the CSB, therefore, does not lie in its escape from
the hermeneutical circle; from such
a circle there is no escape. It lies
rather in how it seeks to define
Lutheranism in relation to the
evangelical theological perspective
of the NSB.
The number of editorial alterations which the CSB has made is
relatively small; and where they
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have been made, the editors have
helpfully indicated their revisions
by means of a dagger. Consequently, it is easy to locate those
places where change was deemed
necessary; and by comparing the
NSB and the CSB at those points it
is possible to discover what the editors hold to be a more distinctively
Lutheran position.
Predictably, the most obvious
changes are to be found in the
notes on sacramental passages. The
NSB consistently denies to Baptism
and the Lord's Supper any interpretation as means of grace. So,
for example, on Titus 3:5 the NSB
comments on the phrase, "the
washing of rebirth," as follows: "a
reference to new birth, of which
baptism (among other things) is a
sign. It cannot mean that baptism is
necessary for regeneration, since
the New Testament plainly teaches
that the new birth is an act of
God's Spirit and is not effected or
achieved by ceremony." To the
same phrase the CSB comments:
"Baptism is a means . .. of our rebirth, a means through which the
Holy Spirit produces in us faith as
a gift of God-all because of God's
mercy."
The same holds true for the Sacrament of the Altar. For example,
when Mark 14:22 reports Jesus as
saying, "This is my body," the NSB
comments: "The bread represented
his body, given for them." This the
CSB has altered to read: "In, with,
and under the bread we receive
Christ's body through a sacramental union." Similarily, on Mark
14:24 the NSB comments: "the cup
represents the blood of Jesus,
which m turn represents his
poured-out life." The CSB says:
"In, with, and under the cup we receive Christ's blood through a sacramental union. Through this sacrament, a means of grace, the Holy
Spirit nourishes faith in believers."
A second series of modifications
begins at Revelation 20:2 . This fa-
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mous passage speaks of a 1,000year binding of Satan-the millennium. NSB notes three basic approaches to the passage: a-millennialism , which regards the 1,000
years as a metaphorical description
of events more characteristically described in the language of the
Apostles' Creed; and pre-millennialism
and
post-millennialism,
both of which attempt to accommodate the 1,000 years into a literal
temporal schema. NSB leaves the
reader to choose which of the three
to adopt, thereby reflecting a divided evangelical house on this
doctrine.

CSB runs the risk
of resolving prematurely
the biblical tension
between the sovereignty
and graciousness of God.
CSB, however, adds a lengthy argumentation on behalf of a-millennialism. It thereby reflects the Lutheran confessional position which
is averse to speculating about the
uncertainties of the future endtime in favor of relying on the accomplished work of Christ. The
echoes of that decision are then
also heard in passages like I Corinthians 15:52, where CSB discourages seeing any reference to a millennium or to a rapture; and
Matthew 25:31-46, where the CSB
note deletes the possibility of a millennialist interpretation.
Other revisions, though not so
obviously dictated by doctrinal convictions, nevertheless do evidence
some subtler doctrinal decisions. In
the Introduction, where the CSB
editors list the six principal teachings of Scripture which govern this
edition, they assign first place to
the doctrine of the grace of God. It
is "the thread that runs throughout
the Scripture and gives unity to all
the books." While granting that

"God is holy, just, all-powerful, allknowing, and the sovereign ruler
of the universe ," they give priority
to the divine attribute of grace.
That conviction translates into an
editorial policy which deletes, often
unnecessarily, notational references
to the sovereignty of God. So, for
example, such revisions are made
repeatedly and surprisingly in Romans 9, a chapter whose theme is
the sovereignty of God. Whereas
the NSB consistently refers to
God's sovereign right (9 : 15),
sovereign freedom (9:21), or God's
sovereignly grafting (9:25-26), the
CSB omits the reference to
sovereignty. Or again, when in the
introductory essay on Genesis the
NSB speaks about "God's sovereign
and gracious intrusion into human
history," the CSB revises that to
read , "God's gracious rule m
human history."
Such revisions perhaps reflect an
excess of well-intentioned zeal to
make the Bible answer too quickly
Luther's burning question, "How
shall I find a gracious God?" They
run the risk of resolving prematurely the biblical tension between
God's sovereignty and God's graciousness. The CSB editors do better by displaying a more balanced
notion of grace when they provide
a matrix for grace in "the recurring
cycle of sin, judgment, and grace,"
and moreover speak of this cycle as
the principal theme of the Bible.
This comes closer to the Lutheran
doctrinal
hermeneutical
key,
namely, the tension between God's
judgment and grace, or, as it is expressed in the Lutheran Confessions, the distinction between the
Law and the Gospel.
Another type of editorial change
made by the CSB is more difficult
to attribute to Lutheran Confessional theology and is more related
to a strong reaction against certain
features of modern historical consciousness. The CSB shares with
the NSB a Messianic understanding
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of the Hebrew Bible, the Christian
Old Testament. Both the NSB and
the CSB take the traditional Christian position that the New Testament finally reveals the mner
meaning of the Old Testament,
and that therefore we may see the
Old Testament already as replete
with Messianic predictions ultimately fulfilled in Jesus Christ.
But the NSB is the more hospitable of the two to preliminary, preMessianic interpretations of Old
Testament passages, drawn from a
comparison with their contemporary world. The CSB often chooses
to ignore them in favor of an exclusive and immediate reference to
Jesus Christ. So, for example, the
NSB in commenting upon Genesis
3: 15 speaks of the antagonism between people and snakes as a symbol of the titanic struggle between
God and the evil one, a struggle
played out in the hearts and history
of mankind with victory finally belonging to Christ. The CSB, however, treats the passage as a direct
prediction of Christ's victory over
the devil, without any wider symbolic meaning.
It is not easy to discern, especially in the absence of any argumentation, why such changes
should be necessary. The NSB's
pre-Messianic, more widely symbolic interpretation of such a passage crescendoes to an ultimately
Messianic
interpretation.
That
would seem to be an acceptable
evangelical understanding of the
passage, respectful both of the
older ecclesiastical tradition, as well
as more modern historical findings.
But that such interpretation should
be deleted, or that such a deletion
is even required by Lutheran theology, places a burden of proof upon
the CSB that it does not discharge.
In a similar way the CSB tightens
up a less restrictive interpretation
which the NSB offers on Psalm
110. The NSB suggests that in
composing this Psalm for the coroOctober, 1987

nation of his son Solompn, David
"spoke a word that had far larger
meaning than he knew." The implication is that the larger meaning
would be revealed in the later
events of subsequent generations,
particularly in Mark 12:35.
However the CSB says the "N.T.
seems to require that David, inspired by the Spirit, was already
pointing beyond that preliminary
application to . . . the Messiah."
David is thus understood as having
consciously predicted a Messiah,
not merely as having unawares spoken more than he consciously
knew. This is presumably, in the
view of the editors of the CSB, a
more Lutheran interpretation of
the biblical notion of prophecy.
Again it is not easy to see why
such an interpretation is to be preferred, much less required, by Lutheran theology. In its comments
on another passage, Isaiah 7: 14,
the CSB does offer a double interpretation. When Isaiah spoke of
Immanuel, he addressed his contemporary generation; but the full
sense of what he had spoken was
explicated later in Matthew 1:23.
This interpretive pattern might
have been employed more consistently, all the more so since it is
fully compatible with the confesof
sional
hermeneutical
key
Lutheranism in the proper distinction between the Law and the Gospel.
The suspicion begins to arise that
the CSB has the agenda, not
merely of providing a Lutheran
version of the NSB, but also of
publishing a version far more intolerant of modern historical and critical consciousness. That suspicion
is confirmed through a look, for
example, at the notes to the phrase,
"the first day," in Genesis 1:5. The
NSB si~ply states, "Some say that
the entation days were 24-hour
days, o hets that they were indefinite pe 1iods." Again, the NSB does
not bi d the reader, but allows a

choice among two options.
However the CSB removes that
choice in favor of a literalist, fundamentalist interpretation. "The
first day was reckoned from evening to morning, according to the
prevailing custom of the Jews. The
six days of creation make up a
period of time equal to Israel's
work week (Ex. 20:9-11)." Undoubtedly ancient Israel and the early
church so regarded the length of
the day. That that remains the only
interpretation for us today is recognizably a very conservative contemporary theological position. But
that that represents in any normative sense a Lutheran position is a
highly debatable proposal.
The plain fact of the matter is
that the NSB is far more candid in
confessing a divided evangelical
house than the CSB is in recognizing a similarly-divided Lutheran
house. And the theological fault
line that runs through both Reformation traditions is a differing
posture toward modern critical and
historical thought. There is as yet
no Lutheran consensus on the
propriety of historical criticism in
interpreting the Bible, as the recent
"Statement of Historical Criticism"
released by the Lutheran Council
in the U.S.A. once more documents.
The CSB has inherited from the
NSB an impressively annotated,
conservative study Bible. And while
it has at some key points drawn
upon a commonly acknowledged
Lutheran doctrinal heritage to
make it more acceptably Lutheran,
it neither adequately reflects the
current spectrum of thinking
among Lutherans, nor does it convincingly argue its more fundamentalist position. But it does thereby
lend urgency to that important annual question for serious Lutherans
how heirs of the Reformation can
best be faithful to their biblical
heritage under the claims of modern historical criticism.
Cl
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Reactions
Dot Nuechterlein
This is addressed to my five
faithful readers (besides Mom, that
is). I don't want you to be puzzled
or dismayed next month when you
turn to the last page of this publication and you don't find the Last
Word. It won't be there.
No, I haven't been fired. (Yet.)
The editor simply cancelled all regular columns for November--except his own, of course, but hey,
every job has its perks-with some
sort of explanation about a fifty
year anniversary coming only once
in a lifetime and needing to be
celebrated in high style.
He means well, of course, and it
is sure to be a treasure of an issue.
I got to peek at the list of guest
writers, and you will certainly enjoy
reading them. But another hey; I
recently observed fifty years of a
lifetime myself, and I couldn't
imagine anything more celebratory
than being surrounded by familiar,
tried and true friends . Why should
a magazine be different?
Anyway, let me take this opportunity to thank those of you who
read these humble offerings on a
more or less regular basis. I am
confident that there are probably
five of you, besides Mom, based on
conversations we have had about
some of the stuff I have written.
Why just the other day one of you
remarked, "Here we are, starting
another season-what kind of nutty
ideas are you going to dump on us
this year?"
This particular individual got a
mite crabby upon reading that
there are a few of us who are not
enamored of cats and dogs. That is
probably the column that received
the most negative reactions of any32

thing I have ever written. Apparently the whole world owns and
adores pets, and a good hunk of
them let me have it for daring to
suggest otherwise. (On the other
hand, I got a couple of handshakes
for being so brave as to speak truly
about sacred cows and all. Was that
even a tear in that dear lady's right
eye, as she explained how she had
actually suffered for her hostility to
hamsters and things? My, my.)
The other piece right up there in
the not-so-pleasant responses department had to do with people
trying to lose weight after New
Year's-and here I had thought
that was a universal problem! But
maybe it just doesn't deserve being
discussed on the back page, for
every mail carrier to see. Someone
might think this is a lightweight rag
of a journal instead of realizing its
devotion to stimulating intellectual
exchange. So I had best keep my
observations on obesity to myself.
Perhaps.

The editor simply
cancelled all regular
columns for Novemberexcept his, of course.
It is true, as another one of you
five commented, that I seem to
write about a great many more dislikes than likes. But what's a poor
girl to do when bats constantly
threaten her life, and February
shows up on every single calendar
ever printed? I didn't invent swimming, or eye makeup, or the practice of referring to the human race
using terms that sound like they
apply to only half of it, or the uncomfortable chairs in doctors' offices , now did I. All I can do is report what goes on around me.
Sometimes it is intriguing to read
what comes in the mail. After my
column on sex a man wrote the editor taking issue with some of my

arguments. Now he had some excellent points to make. But I
couldn't help thinking that he supported my general thesis quite well,
which was that males and females
tend to think about and react differently to many aspects of that
subject. To be honest, I haven't
quit cogitating about it myself-the
eternal fascination, and all that-so
don't be surprised if it crops up
again on this page.
The most positive reactions to
my writing have come on two different items, both printed elsewhere, one serious and one not.
The first was a little book of
prayers I composed two decades
ago that was given away to people
who listened to a certain religious
radio broadcast. I don't know this
for a fact, but someone told me
that thousands were distributed.
Anyway, to this day I run into
people who hear my name and
then, after a moment's thought,
will say, "Say, aren't you the one
who wrote ... ?" That's fun. It was
also the first piece of writing I ever
got paid for-not a great deal, but
a big deal to me at the time, so it
sticks in my mind.
The other was a newspaper article. In a previous life I did a
weekly series on community points
of interest; when I had what
seemed to be an unusual experience I wrote it up and submitted it
to my editor for his critique. He
ran it as a special feature. It had to
do with a 1,000 mile trip I took
with my husband and three children age four and under, with
enough belongings and diapers and
things for a month, in an old VW
bug. Now from time to time I have
been known to "embellish" a fact
here or there, but in that piece I
did not make up one single solitary
bit, and it was, if I do say so myself, hilarious. I do not expect to
ever equal it.
So, friends, a temporary farewell.
See you in December.
Cl
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